The report committee for Peter Daniel Russell certifies that this is the approved version of the following report

Monarchies versus Republics in the Arab Spring: a social identity approach for understanding leader fragility and mass mobilization.

SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Jason Brownlee, Supervisor

Zoltan Barany

Monarchies versus Republics in the Arab Spring: a social identity approach for understanding leader fragility and mass mobilization.

by

Peter Daniel Russell

Report

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin
August 2020

Monarchies versus Republics in the Arab Spring: a social identity approach for understanding leader fragility and mass mobilization.

by

Peter Daniel Russell, MA
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020
SUPERVISOR: Jason Brownlee

This report targets a specific pattern in the outcomes related to the Arab uprisings in 2011 and uses them to make a broader argument about the psycho-social dynamics of autocratic rule and resistance. It asks, what explains the broad trend of the 2011 Arab uprisings that saw the leaders of Arab republics pushed out of their positions of power, while monarchies were left largely unscathed? Common institutional, structural, and strategic explanations for the varying stability of Arab regimes across type elide a crucial mechanism of autocratic strength related to legitimacy, affect, and the varying patterns of social identity in the Arab world. Utilizing recent research in psychology, leadership, and identity studies, this report argues that monarchies were largely able to prevent and manage mass opposition because of the affective position they inherited and maintained through a pattern of historical continuity and modern development that better suit the monarchies of the Middle East. Further, I argue that this variation along regime-type reflects a broader shift in the political dynamics of the Middle East, with behavioral and ideational factors taking on a greater relevance to understanding the stability of autocratic regimes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I: Introduction

During the mass uprisings of 2011 in the Arab world, nearly all of the now-fallen or struggling republics of the Arab world attempted to appease protests by offering promises of reform, with a few rulers even offering to step down voluntarily and turn over a nascent reform process to other state actors. Yet for the most part, the citizens of these republics rejected these offers, labeling them as empty promises and pointing toward past examples of tendentious reform pledges from the regime. In fact, often the reaction to offers of reform was increased anger among the population, and renewed commitment to full regime change (Shadid and Kirkpatrick 2011). In both cases, efforts to diffuse opposition through limited concessions was spectacularly unsuccessful. Following this failed strategy, dictators were forced to use violence against protestors (Syria, Libya) or were forced out of power by the opposition and/or other political actors in the government (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and now Algeria and Sudan).

Contrast the experiences of republic dictators to their contemporary colleagues in the Arab monarchies, and a different picture emerges. Of the three Arab monarchies that saw significant protest activity, only one was forced to resort to significant repression tactics (Bahrain), whereas the two poor, politically-limited monarchs of the region (Morocco, Jordan) were able to quell protests with promises of reform and superficial political deck shuffling. In Morocco, Mohammad VI promised a new constitution, one in which small concessions were made to political parties – themselves largely complicit in state control – and did little to devolve power from the king or strengthen civil society (Benchemsi 2012). Following his announcement, protest activity dipped significantly and faded altogether by the time the new constitution was ratified (Barany 2013). Likewise, in Jordan, Abdullah II was able to effectively reduce the scale of protests around the country by dissolving the parliament and also promising a new constitution, both of which were strategies the monarchy had engaged in

previously, and neither of which constituted significant political reform (Yom and Gause III 2012). Yet, citizens of Jordan and Morocco seemed relatively satisfied with these essentially incredible – as opposed to credible – promises; at least, a large portion of them returned to their home, with no guarantee of significant change and a history of broken promises similar to their partners in Arab republics. What explains the discrepancy in the effects of reform commitments between the monarchies and the republics? Why did similar offers of reform – offers that had worked well previously in both regime types – inspire opposition and indignation in the republics while demobilizing protests in the Jordan and Morocco?

I address this question by proposing a novel causal mechanism from social psychology that highlights the role of political leaders in the construction and maintenance of social group identities, the constraints imposed upon them by the association of group identities with significant past political events, and their subsequent ability to communicate effectively during times of political crises (i.e. their ability to effectively demobilize opposition). The post-independence, nationalist projects of the Arab republics forged cohesive, but ultimately unstable national identities that collapsed in the face of 1) poor economic, political, and military performance on the part of the Arab republics and 2) the inability (or unwillingness) of subsequent leaders to embody the leadership qualities of past nationalist leaders, further destabilizing foundational identities and attenuating the leader's position as a legitimate medium of communication during crisis. Conversely, the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco largely avoided (or coopted) assimilating nationalist projects in the post-independence period, leaving room for the construction and maintenance of multi-faceted – and thereby more stable – identity structures that 1) could accommodate aspects of both traditional and modern political identities and 2) placed the monarch squarely at the top as a neutral arbiter of diverse social coalitions. Additionally, the monarchs themselves invested significant effort to embody the traits consistent with expectations of past monarchs as well as those derived from newer political identities. This reinforced the larger national

identity, of which the monarch was the head representative, and cemented his position as a legitimate medium of communication during political crises, enhancing his ability to demobilize opposition through promises of reform.

Beyond the variation in outcomes across regime type, I link the focus on social identity to a broader argument for increased attention among MENA scholars to the mechanisms of legitimacy in autocratic regimes, a factor of autocratic stability that is oft-overlooked in favor of structural and institutional arguments. The increasing penetration of television and digital technologies has altered the political dynamic in the Middle East, such that autocrats themselves are at increased risk of being pushed out of power by mass protests if they allow themselves to become cast as the "villain" of the broader political narrative (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). While regime structure themselves may be less threatened by this newer form of opposition, it does introduce a level of instability into autocracies that threatens their ability to maintain their structural advantage. Moreover, it forces autocrats themselves into high-risk strategies of identity construction and innovation in an attempt to shore up waning legitimacy, strategies that can easily backfire if it relies on less credible affective narratives. In a world in which autocrats and regimes are themselves limited by the structural constraints of global capital - and the difficulty of regulating increasingly complex communication systems - it is clear that mass, digitally-mediated forms of social organization represent an increasing threat to autocrats, and by extension, the regimes that support them. As such, scholars would do well to turn their focus to the processes that construct and motivate these mass movements: which lie largely in the behavioral, cognitive, and micro-foundational realm.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, I make the case for a shift in focus to the behavioral and cognitive micro-foundations that are critical in identity formation, narrative construction, and mass mobilization. By targeting a gap in the commonly used concept of legitimacy, I present the argument for incorporating Social Identity Theory – and its descendants – to better understand the role that these

micro-foundations play in strengthening or weakening autocratic regimes. These are intertwined with the structural and elite-level variables that scholars tend to preference when analyzing the Middle East, and they have taken on even more relevance as digital media penetration has increased in MENA societies. Finally, I lean on recent research in leadership behavior and identity construction to advance the argument that MENA monarchies – even the oil-poor – have maintained their legitimacy to a greater extent than their republican counterparts. As evidence, I have included analysis of a series of fixed-effects logistic model linking protest activity of citizens to a lack of trust in various government institutions, both of which are mediated by digital media usage. This data is derived from individual-level opinion surveys and includes 3,500 to 6,500 observations per model. I then present a qualitative, historical analysis targeting Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, meant to attach a concrete narrative to various abstract concepts laid out in the report.

II: Micro-foundations and the case for a shift in focus

A shift from structural factors to individual level affective and cognitive processes may sound familiar to social movement scholars. However, for observers of the MENA region, it alters the established hierarchy of forces contributing to the persistence of autocratic and hybrid regimes in the region. The robustness of the security apparatuses of MENA autocrats is forms the backbone of autocratic strength, providing a hard repressive tool capable of imposing high costs on dissidents (Bellin 2004). This material strength is buttressed by autocrats' elite coalitions, funded via rent-seeking and manipulation of the economy, the benefits of which are often distributed via sham legislative bodies (Blaydes 2010). This elite-level control also ensures that civil society organizations – themselves requiring the investment of time and resources usually available to the social elite – are held firmly within the governing coalition (Yom 2005). Mass mobilization and contentious politics from the public arena, then, are often relegated to tertiary importance when considering regime-level outcomes (regime change, leadership exit, state failure, etc.).

Certainly, when considering the outcomes of the Arab Spring, this hierarchy makes broad sense. In their reprisal of Arab Spring outcomes, Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2014) noted that – irrespective of the size and intensity of local protests – the viability of autocrats facing discontent was determined by the extent to which their military and security apparatuses, as well as their elite coalitions, maintained their loyalty to the regime. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen - where the military and various elite groups abandoned the leader - the autocrat fell. In Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco - where the governing coalition held strong - autocrats persisted, absent outside intervention. Even in the resource poor monarchies of Jordan and Morocco – whose structural advantage is rather limited - the durability of these autocrats has been explained via the strategic acumen of the autocrats themselves, again preferencing structural and elite-level variables (Yom and Gause III 2012; Barany 2011).

Yet, it plausible that the ultimate leverage that structural advantages afford autocrats, and the success of their strategies to prevent and contain contentious action, are directly tied to the attitudes of individuals in society. Scholars interested in the paradox of repression have long demonstrated that the heavy use of security apparatuses can backfire dramatically when repressed populations respond not with fear, but with anger or outrage (Smithy and Kurtz 2018). This variation indicates that it is not the might of repressive tactics themselves that produce favorable outcomes for autocrats, but it is instead the emotional reactions they are able to produce; emotions that are tied to the affective orientations and cognitive processes of the population. Similarly, elites are assumed to be relatively instrumental in their dedication to a given leader (Svolik 2010). When confronted, therefore, with intense and seemingly enraged opposition from society (not the type to respond favorably to repression), it is less likely that they are going to stick by their dictator, especially if their own fate is not tied to his. We saw this dynamic play out spectacularly in Egypt when, seeing that Mubarak's security forces would be unable to contain protestors on the famous "Day of Rage", the military moved to intervene, and soon offered Mubarak to the people after dissociating themselves from him.

In addition, the efficacy of strategic moves (highly selective repression, the superficial offer of reforms amidst contentious periods that seemed to quiet protests in Jordan and Morocco were undergirded by a presumed credibility of the autocrat; credibility stemming from some measure of trust in his ability (Yom 2013; Benchesmi 2012). Indeed, similar reform offers in Egypt and Tunisia (and more recently in democratic states such as Lebanon or Iraq) were rejected soundly, serving only to further enrage protestors. Simply put, the structural and institutional inputs help set the stage of contentious politics, and provide autocrats with tools of maintaining power. It is the attitudes of the people, however, and their reaction to the use of those tools that determine their ultimate value to the autocrat.

Yet, this is not to say that micro-foundations operate in a vacuum. The changing structures of communications technologies – along with the constraints imposed by global capitalism – have weakened the structural advantages that autocrats hold over their societies, and have allowed for the formation of oppositional frames that my otherwise have struggled to propagate across the loosely organized and diverse ideological societies of the MENA region. Indeed, the Islamist and the educated liberal have little to agree on in terms of the political society they envision for the future. They were, however, allied by their mutual distrust and anger toward the institutions of government, and the significant diversity of their coalition was hidden by the variety of digital platforms available.

In other words, the emotional and cognitive processes that encourage an individual's decision to protest are socially mediated, rather than generated solely in the individual mind, and while there are a few studies that have examined emotional and cognitive triggers of contentious politics in MENA, they tend to remain rather isolated to their effects at the individual level, rather than drawing in the social processes involving the formation and spread of political communities that help define individualized perceptions. Indeed, the most recent psychological and sociological literature points to affective orientations, reflex emotions, and cognitive distortions as products of social and political environment of an individual (Jasper 2018). Their affective responses to regime leaders, the urgency of political crises, the specific, targeted causes of economic stagnation, are all drawn to some extent by the prevailing perspective of an individual's community. Micro-foundational research in MENA often references broad emotional moods or generalized perceptions that drive an individual's decision-making, but it can be vague about the processes that contribute to the development of these generalized emotional or cognitive climes. Part of the contribution of this study is to draw in recent work from the field of communications that describes the process of forming broad political communities in the digital era, thus providing a link between the structural factors that place stress on MENA societies and their affective and cognitive reactions to these stressors. The necessary formation of physical social networks

(CSOs, religious organizations, etc.) that help build and fuel opposition is short-circuited to some extent by the ability of digital networks to draw masses of individual into a broad movement, setting the stage for the emotional and identity work necessary to motivate dangerous protest action in the region.

However, if some structural alterations were necessary conditions in breathing life into the streets of the Arab world, the narratives employed to motivate protest participation, and the emotional and cognitive landscape that they fell upon, were the sufficient factors in producing mass movements broad enough to threaten historically stable autocrats. This role highlights the methods by which autocratic regimes legitimate themselves, and the expectations they create when doing so. In order to obtain legitimacy, a regime must legitimate itself, a process that breaks down into two components, supply and demand (Haldenwang 2017). They describe the interplay between the "right to rule" (Gilley 2009, Haldenwang 2017) of governments, and the right to dissent within society (Rawls 2005, Haldenwang 2017). On the supply side, governments put forward a legitimacy claim, one that – to be successful – must either conform to or causally alter the behavioral and affective orientations of the populace. On the demand side, populations ask for performance in bettering the common good, that concept itself defined by the expectations constructed by political leadership, as well as the political and cultural history of a given state (Haldenwang 2017).

Historically, the concept of legitimacy has been difficult to grasp or explain, even for scholars whose research focuses on it. I do not claim to offer much in terms of a more concrete explanation – largely due to the paucity of targeted data available for the concept in the MENA region – but research in psychology and sociology have given us better tools to discuss how legitimacy is formed, as well as its component parts. In particular, it targets the necessity of building and maintaining a broad social identity that sets common expectations of in-group members and leadership, as well as the components necessary for building that identity, and the way in which they can operate upon certain cognitive and emotional cues common in a population. These psycho-social processes are linked not only to the

structure of digital media, but also to the behavior of autocratic leaders and the critical role it plays in the structure of social identity in a given state. How the autocrat is evaluated - and the affective response he produces in the general population - depend in a large part upon the consistency of his behavior and record with previously generated expectations of the leader's role in politics and society. Past choices about the autocrat's personal political status, institutional power, and governing coalition produce affective structures that color the perceptions of the general citizenry. Autocrats that fail to reinforce these expectations, or act contrary to them, risk destabilizing broad behavioral patterns that reinforce their rule. In addition, this argument will specifically target the differing legitimation patterns of monarchs and the leaders of republics, wherein the former leader type benefitted from historically stable identity structures, and worked within those structures to maintain their legitimate authority. The latter inherited large-scale nationalist projects that were inherently unstable, and rather than attempt to reconstitute a modern national identity under their authority, instead turned toward securitization and division to maintain autocratic control. While this strategy proved stable for some time, it sowed the seeds for widespread opposition frames that placed the autocrat as the sole target for previously diverse, disconnected opposition groups.

Taken together, this argument calls for a greater appreciation of the individual-level attitudes that contribute to large-scale structural outcomes in the MENA region, and for a greater attention the multi-faceted nature of power (see, Lukes 2004). Autocrats in MENA have competed – and dominated – at the structural and institutional level for decades. Yet, many have ignored the plane upon which identity and behavioral factors operate. As the next section will argue, the rise of the internet and increasing digital media usage provided opposition movements with new, identity-driven tools to motivate protestors, enough to at least destabilize regimes structures and push widely hated autocrats out of power.

III: Digital media, new organizing forms and principles

Key to the premises of this analysis is the assertion that 1) autocrats are in a moderately weaker structural position than they have been in the past, and 2) that the ultimate fate of autocrats depends more heavily on the processes of identity formation and the resonance of oppositional narrative, particularly the position of the autocrat in that narrative. These assertions are made credible by the alterations in communications environment of the region, beginning with the rise of disruptive televisions networks, such as Al-Jazeera, and culminating in the increased usage of social media sites to mediate protests and foster opposition identities. This section covers the role of digital media in drawing masses into protest movements. The loose "networks of outrage and hope" (Castells 2015) that have formed emotionally charged digital communities are crucial to providing a platform for opposition movements to form. These communities then operate to pull individuals into broad protest movements by relying on moral narratives, heuristics, and personalized protest frames that can obscure participant diversity that might otherwise short-circuit mass action. While these processes do not necessarily depend upon mass adoption of social media, or mass television viewing, it is evidence that these technologies act as meeting points or binding agents between disparate physical communities, and that it draws in and empowers previously unassociated individuals over and above those who might be active in political organizations. Additionally, these mechanisms are more powerful when the identity structures that have traditionally been utilized in the nation-building projects of the region have weakened, leaving citizens searching for other attachments, and weakening the ability of the autocrat to control his position in new identity structures**.** Finally, I present the results of a quantitative analysis of opinion polling in the MENA region, demonstrating that digital media usage was a strong determinant of protest attendance, and that attitudes related to distrust in government institutions – often a measure of legitimacy - were more consistent predictors of protest participation than with those related to economic or security conditions.

The idea that political communities are able to transmit and frame the type of information that might destabilize autocracies is certainly not new, and that fact is reflected in the numerous references in recent research to burgeoning "Pan-Arab identities" (Yom and Gause III 2012), the newly activated "Arab Street" (Bayat 2017; Eickelman 2003), and in particular, a rise in digitally-mediated communities that serve to replace traditional civil society organizations capable of organizing contentious action and destabilizing regimes (Beissinger 2015, Lawson 2015, Khraidy 2016). These communities not only reveal and connect disparate discontented individuals, but provide the language, symbols, affective orientations, and emotional cues that help us to interpret our everyday reality. As such, they are natural foci for research seeking to understand the interplay between micro-foundations and macro-trends.

Yet, current research targeting cognitive or emotional factors in mass protests – particularly in the MENA region – often elide the causal role of digital media in activating and sharpening these factors. The two most prominent analyses of the micro-foundations of the Arab Spring protests target cognitive heuristics and motivated reasoning. Weyland (2012) is the prime example of the former, though others have made similar analyses (Hale 2013; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2013). This perspective relies on the contributions to the field of psychology made by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), who introduced prospect theory to the social sciences. It argues that individuals who perceive themselves to be in the "domain of losses" - seeing their likely future social circumstances as less palatable than the present – are more likely to take risks in order to prevent those losses, and to make decisions based on heuristic shortcuts and faulty information. Weyland argues that both the citizens of Tunisia and those who participated in the cascade of uprisings around the region had perceived themselves to be in the domain of losses for some time, particularly following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Thus, when faced with the stunning images of dissent, they quickly calculated that they could mount similar challenges in their own settings, without considering differences of conditions. In sum, the decisions of

protestors in the Arab Spring were boundedly rational (Jones 1999), which explains the diverse and inexperienced make-up, as well as the quick dissolution, once the reality of their limited power set in.

Pearlman (2013) is an example of the argument targeting motivated reasoning, which incorporates recent findings from neuroscience and the influence of emotions. She draws a distinction between emotions that are essentially disabling (i.e. fear or shame) and those that are empowering (i.e. hope or indignation), arguing that under social conditions in which disabling emotions are the norm, contentious action in opposition to the regime are highly unlikely. Conversely, as the emotional climate shifts toward empowering emotions, then individuals might be mobilized for mass action, despite the potential costs associated with it. Pearlman goes on to argue that the emotional climate of the Middle East had been changing over time, and that with self-immolation of Bouazizi was a trigger that cemented the presence of empowering emotions and downplayed the traditionally dominant emotions of fear and shame; this climate then quickly dispersed throughout the region via social media. Under this perspective, individual citizens always had the incentive and the motivation to organize but needed a change in the emotional climate to change their calculations of instrumentality.

There is evidence for both of these processes operating during and following the Arab Spring. Importantly, however, both perspectives locate the conditions driving decision-making processes outside of the digital world, with new media acting solely as a conduit for the triggers associated with either emotional climates or prospective evaluations. Yet, triggers for action exist in everyday society, and are often not acted upon. Individuals are made aware from protests from friends, family, or physical proximity, yet do not join. Self-immolation as a form of protest, for example, had been used previously in the region (Khraidy 2016). What is it about the transmission of images and information over the internet – or alternatively through mass television – that makes triggers more effective than those in everyday society?

In the field of political science, there is limited recourse in responding to the above question. By a fair distance, Marc Lynch remains one of the elite scholars most committed to describing and analyzing the slowly forming political communities across the region, the majority of the time with a focus on the media that facilitate this formation. In *Voices of the New Arab Public* (2006), Lynch makes a pre-Arab-uprising argument about the impact of new media on the disruption of a monolithic public sphere, one traditionally characterized by social and political quiescence, as well as an explicit devotion to the autocrat (Wedeen 2015). Cultivating dissenting voices on televisions networks and internet platforms, Lynch argues, disrupts the presumption of both outside observers and Arab citizens themselves that the public is tied strongly to the autocrat; or at least, that they are sufficiently cowed by the autocrat's intimidation tactics. In many ways, the argument mirrors the events of the uprising in the eyes of Middle East observers. The Arab public was presumed quiescent, until new media sources revealed otherwise; similarly, the foundations of Arab autocracy were presumed sound, until the uprisings revealed otherwise. While it is notable that the uprisings did little to thoroughly topple regimes across the region, it certainly shook the foundations of autocratic stability. Yet, despite Lynch's work - as well as the post-uprising work of others analyzing the role of the internet and television in fostering discontent (i.e. Tufecki and Wilson 2014) – there remains limited specific theorizing on how these communities are formed, how widespread they become, and the conditions under which they produce frames strong enough to motivate widespread contentious action.

Part of the answer to how these communities form and spread lies in the dual-processing theories of cognitive psychology and its relation to the structured information environment of the internet and television. Dual-process theory has been developing in the field of psychology for some time, but perhaps the first clear proposal of the theory lies with Jonathan Evans (see Evans 2008 for review). It claims that humans – conditional on their surrounding environment – process information by two methods. Type I processing is considered automatic, fast, and bias-driven, whereas Type II

processing is considered, long-term, and (relatively) objective (Smith and DeCoster 2000). Though dual-processing theories exist in a number of forms throughout various fields of psychology, the common model asserts that when presented with new information, individuals will rely primarily upon Type I processing, drawing from their previous experiences – and assorted biases – to make automatic decisions; that is, unless they are afforded the time or external stimuli to work slower, and allow more reasoned Type II processing to take over (Evans and Stanovich 2013). In situations where a subject is inexperienced, Type I processing often leads to poor decision-making outcomes, as the individual has limited default memory to rely on when processing new information (Smith and DeCoster 2000). Type I processing is thought to occur more frequently in both saturated and fast information environments, in which individuals' ability to actually process all the information available to them is limited, and they therefore default to shorter heuristic decision-processes (Ibid).

Not surprisingly recent literature from psychology and neurosciences have begun to associate Type I processing with internet, social media usage, and television usage (Bandura 2009). In the case of internet platforms association derives from three characteristics, in addition to its assumed status as a saturated information environment. First, the profit model of internet platforms relies on advertising and dissemination, encouraging users to click through pages as quickly as possible in order to enhance the viewership of as many advertisers and digital content providers as possible (Walther, Gay, and Hancock 2005). Second, again driven by the profit model of online businesses, the structure of the internet information flow is inherently associative, meaning that connections are formed preconsciously, based on similarities with previous patterns of behavior, without much structure relying on language, logic, or culturally-invested symbols (Harris and Sanborn 2013, pg 18; Smith and DeCoster 2000). As platforms gather data points, they feed information to the user based on simple similarities, but algorithms have little understanding of the meaning of various data points, pursuing pattern completion rather than underlying meanings. Thus, as an individual spends more time online, their

previous behaviors and biases are reinforced by the information connections generated by the various platforms on which they operate. Third, and related, the focus on pattern completion – in addition to the autonomous control that internet users have over the content that they engage with – means that disconfirming or intervening information that might trigger a pause in the quicker, Type I processing patterns of individuals is largely absent (Farrell 2012). Scholars of dual-processing theory contend that individuals tend to default to Type I processing patterns unless there is sufficient time or stimuli provided to encourage slower, reasoned thinking (Turel et. al 2014).

Importantly, the above effects are distinct features of internet platforms, rather than traditional television. While much early identity work was driven by the rise of disruptive platforms such as Al-Jazeera (Lynch 2005), its structure limits the ultimate impact that it has in motivating participation. Not only is there less information contained in a television screen – relative to the complex screens of internet platforms – but it lacks the interactivity aspect that both motivates participation by the subject and provides information to the platform such that it can adapt to user preferences (Harris and Sanborn 2013). Additionally, television programming lacks the democratic control and anonymity available to social media sites, especially in autocratic states (Atton 2015), and therefore oppositional frames are more difficult to develop from the grassroots level. Thus, while television might play a role in spreading or amplifying opposition messaging, it is doubtful that it can serve as usefully in creating that messaging, or motivating community formation in the same manner.

This suggests that – regardless of the socially-derived motivations for protest – information transmitted over, or refracted through, the internet is likely to encounter individuals more susceptible to quick, impulsive action than those mobilized via other networks (organizational, community, etc.). In fact, one study of the neural pathways activated while engaged on social media concluded that the centers of the brain related to impulsive, preconscious decision making were strongly activated, whereas the areas related to slower, conscious thinking were largely dormant (ibid). Thus, whether an

individual was concerned over their future prospects – or emotionally empowered by anger or indignation – the transmission of information over new media sources seems to encourage individuals to rely on those pre-formed states, rather than activating slower, cautious reasoning processes. In that sense, the medium of information transmission acts as important intervening variable drawing actors that might otherwise had been traditionally difficult to mobilize – despite the clear presence of grievances – into mass protest.

Some observational and experimental evidence exists to support the idea that internet dissemination produced behavioral reactions that responded quicker than those mobilized by other means. In Tunisia, the geographical pattern of the spread of initial anti-regime protests from Sidi Bouzid – deep in the hinterland – directly to middle-class university graduates in the capitol city stands as one such example. Instead of spreading through traditional geographical, labor, and religious networks embedded in Tunisia's heartland, the protests jumped quickly to the unemployed graduates in Tunis, individuals who have little in common with an informal fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid other than a basic frustration with the regime. Labor unions and religious networks were far slower to join the fray, and required significant demonstration effects - in the form of mass protests in the capitol - prior to participating (Bradley 2012). Similar patterns were observed in Egypt, where participation in the first day of protests was most strongly and robustly correlated with discovering about them via Facebook (Tufekci and Wilson 2012). This matches the narrative of most observers of the protests in Tahrir, where numerous scholars noted the initial participation of seemingly unaffiliated individuals, with Islamist and labor groups joining only later.

Implied in the above paragraph is the binding role played by digital media, particularly on social media platforms. This role is key to constructing broad identities capable of drawing in the masses to protest movements, building on the previous identity-construction processes of print media and televisions (Anderson 1983). The essential difference, according to recent work in communications

technology, is the personalized action frames constructed on internet platforms, facilitated by the anatomy of digital platforms, and providing for the formation of a loose, imagined community capable of drawing in diverse groups of actors. Following the recent surge in digitally-mediated, mass protest movements across the globe, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) proposed a new theory for understanding digital community formation amidst the waning influence of traditional civil society organizations worldwide. Coining the phrase *connective action*, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that these more individualized citizens of the modern era - as opposed to socialized through traditional networks – are conditioned to look for more personalized reasons to associate with larger groups, pathways that accommodate a wide variety of social backgrounds and preferences (pg 6). The internet is uniquely suited to provide these frames due to its ability to host large, diverse communities while simultaneously filtering noisy information not relevant to the individual participant (ibid). An activist may be able to create a relatively general frame, such as "We Are all Khalid Said" or "We are the 99%" and allow the filtering and self-selection processes of internet platforms to connect individuals to posts and to potential compatriots that share similar goals, while simultaneously obscuring the true diversity of the community. This allows for the participation of mass, diverse groups of people along highly personalized lines, while eliminating the chaos associated with horizontal networks in the physical world. By this process, individuals who have previously eschewed organizational affiliations can begin to identify with a larger, though unreal community.

However, while simultaneously providing the scaffolding for mass community connections, digital media also carries with it an intense interactivity component, again a feature that is vital to drawing in and binding diverse participants. Designed in part to provide more data points for platform administrators and advertising algorithms, most internet platforms – whether social or news media – have installed a complex system of social feedback mechanisms encouraging individuals to 1) create performances in the form of pictures, videos, and testimonials that signal their membership in an online

community and 2) affirm the performances of others in a mutually reinforcing recognition process (Harris and Sanborn 2013). As platforms continue to attract participants and generate connections between them, it provides for an incredibly large pool of potential rewards for individuals performing their membership in a given online community often fostering an attachment to the immediacy and loose conditionality of that rewards system (Przybylski et. al 2013).

In addition to the role that online platforms play in drawing individuals into diverse communities, they also play a role in activating or sharpening psychological conditions that might draw protestors into movements. The create far more connections than any one person can reasonably engage with, fostering a recently-named phenomenon: "Fear of Missing Out" (see ibid.). Though FOMO has only become a subject for study in the last few years, numerous empirical works have drawn a strong connection between it and social media use (ibid; Elhai et al 2016; Royal Society for Public Health 2017). It is described as an anxiety that others may be having rewarding experiences that an individual is missing out on and is driven by the proliferation of individual performances found in online community. Importantly, FOMO is thought to be linked to low needs satisfaction in an individual's life (Ellison, Steinfield, C. and Lampe 2007; Przybylski et. al 2013). What this anxiety encourages, therefore, is constant attention to – and participation in – online communities, often to the exclusion of physically proximate social networks (Harris and Sanborn 2015).

Though the study of FOMO has not been a priority in the Arab world, nor in connection with the Arab Spring, there seems to be some evidence of its presence. Social media is widely recognized as a social outlet for isolated individuals in autocratic and culturally restrictive states, providing a means for expressing oneself and finding others who might not fit the politically and culturally proscribed lifestyles of a given society, and there seems to be evidence that those who contributed most to the protest participation were peripheral network members (Steinert-Threlkeld 2017; Bennet, Segerberg, and Yan 2018). However, specific studies linking FOMO to internet usage or to participation in Arab Spring

protests have yet to be conducted. Certainly, the influence of FOMO as a mechanism drawing individuals into online communities, and encouraging active maintenance and participation, would help to explain the sheer volume of previously unaffiliated individuals drawn into mass protests. If, as is hypothesized by researchers, FOMO indeed inspires participation in online communities, then there is reason to believe that it would also inspire individuals to attend protests, as photos and testimonials from there time there would be a key mode of demonstrating participation online. There is certainly a tentatively established connection between the visibility of decisions made in online networks that motivation physical attendance at protest events (Steinert-Threlkeld 2017; Larson et al 2016). In any case, further research on the connections between FOMO, internet usage, and the dynamics of movement participation is likely warranted.

Beyond their structural effects, internet platforms also provide content that contributes to the formation of oppositional narratives that motivate action. Scholars of political behavior have long thought that a key part of motivating individuals to participate in politics -whether by voting or contentious actions – is the construction of a moral narrative (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009), wherein the issues at stake activate deep, black-and-white beliefs about how the world should be. It is these narratives that raise the stakes for non-participation, and soften the costs of risky action (Jasper 2018). Triggering strongly felt affective structures in this way helps to motivate action in the defense of these structures, a basic behavioral mechanism that ensures the world remains legible to the individual (see Robinson et. al 2006).

Yet, unifying diverse opposition groups around a single moral narrative can often be quite difficult, especially if the conversation remains limited to abstract concepts. The aforementioned personalized structure of digital media platforms helps to overcome that obstacle to some extent, but recently social movement scholars have begun to focus more seriously on character work within these narratives. Characters – they argue – are essential in providing legibility to narratives (Jasper, Young,

and Zuern 2018). Various characters carry with them cultural and symbolic meanings that help communicate intended emotions to observers, and to encourage the processes of common identification that operate along visual lines (Whittier 2001).

In particular, social movement scholars tend to focus on the "essential triad" of characters in any moral narrative; the villain, the victim, and the hero (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018). While various societies have specific social roles that they assign to each category, they tend to be defined commonly along three dimensions. Is the subject good or bad? Is the subject powerful or weak? Is the subject active or passive? According to this theory – derived from Affect Control Theory in psychology – heroes tend to be good, powerful, and variably active (generally passive until threatened by a villain); villains tend to be bad, powerful, and consistently active (representing at threat); victims tend to be good, weak, and passive (motivating their defense on the part of the hero) (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). The credible assignment of these character roles to figures within the political sphere can work to motivate action on behalf of victims, against the villains, in which the participants themselves become the heroes. The ability of digital media platforms to quickly disseminate images of victims and identify villains, and encouraging diverse groups to identity with – or against, in the case of villains – these characters, is a critical part of forming opposition movements in the digital sphere.

Despite differing roles, heroes and victims are often seen as mirror images of each other. Both are powerful, and both are active participants in the political sphere. The critical difference between them is whether they have a positive or negative affective attachment to the citizenry. An autocrat's identity work can be a distinguishing factor in whether they are viewed generally positively or negatively in the eyes of the population. If a negative affect becomes too widespread, then the autocrat has readily provided opposition movements with an easily identifiable – and recognized – villain for their narratives. Similarly, the actions of the autocrat in the political sphere can help to shift the balance in one direction or another. Heroes are more admired when they are seen as generally passive, becoming

active only in response to threats to victims (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018). For example, the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco both place themselves as formally above electoral politics, generally outside of the political fray until their influence is needed (Clark 2018). A heavily securitized republican state on the other hand, where security forces linked to the autocrat are active in their repressive roles, can lead to an increased perception of needless – and perhaps villainous – activity on behalf of the autocrat. With the digital media able to disseminate and activate images that characterize actors in the political sphere, it is crucial that the autocrat is attentive to the credibility of his image as a villain, and the way in which is own actions help contribute to the overarching narrative.

Both autocratic and democratic governments would likely be concerned about protest dynamics that are effective in drawing masses into contentious action, but these dynamics are particularly sharp in autocratic states for a few reasons. The first of these has already been stated, that digital media fills a crucial organizing gap in autocratic societies where associational life is both heavily controlled and broadly discouraged. This therefore represents a greater shift in the power balance between the regime and mass society, one that is likely smaller than in mature democracies with more robust civil society organizations. However, the second is the underlying social conditions that tend to occur more often in autocratic societies, and especially those of the Middle East. Most of the studies covered above recognize the independent causal power produced by the design effects of digital media, but also imply an interaction between those effects and emotional states such as anxiety and isolation. Those working with social identity in particular have drawn strong connections between online communities and a need to belong that is not fulfilled in physical networks (Duman and Ozkara 2019; Turkle 2011). Simply put, it seems that societies with a poor associational life, limited freedoms, and national identification would experience the pull effects of digital media more strongly.

It is worth noting here that a hallmark of the robust authoritarian states of the MENA region is the suppression of associational life and the depoliticization of the populace, often at the expense of the

more active nation-building projects that characterized the early independence periods (Anderson 1991). The nationalist leaders of that era (Bourguiba, Nasser, etc.) were able to effectively mobilize their citizenry around a new national project. Yet, the stagnation of these projects in the subsequent years, combined with the death of the most of the original nationalists, threatened the stability of these regimes. Dangerous new identity models – particularly that of Political Islamists - then prompted a shift by most states toward demobilization and securitization of the populace, as well as a disruption of associational life (Bellin 2004). While this shift was felt most strongly in the previously nationalist republics it characterized the experiences of many if not most states in the region. It represented a general ceding of the field in the plane of competition for the hearts and minds of Arab citizens. Of course, Islamist organizations are still relatively strong in the MENA region, and have been for decades. However, over the years they have tended to find various settlements with autocrats, such that they might continue to operate without the threat of regime overthrow (Wagemakers 2016; LaCroix 2016). These groups rediscovered their oppositional power in during the Arab Spring, but not uniformly, and only after the demonstration effects provided by the unaffiliated masses.

In some ways, the instability in the early Islamist period operated via similar identity processes as that of the Arab Spring, yet without the digital media, the effect was siloed among those connected to those organizations, and the alternative provided by Islamists failed to inspire wider society. The introduction of widespread digital media, in particular online platforms, provided the scaffolding and content for a broad opposition movement that was inclusive of diverse groups, a phenomenon that has already produced instability for autocrats of the region, and will likely continue to do so in the foreseeable future (Beissinger 2017).

While the next section will cover in more detail the fundamentals of social identity theory, and the role that autocrats play in suppressing or encouraging opposition movements, I first examine the claims made above from a quantitative perspective. There exists limited data sufficient for gaining

causal leverage on these questions, but given the theoretical underpinnings, correlation is likely a sufficient indicator. In the beginning of this section, I provided two assertions underpin the relevance of digital media. First, that autocrats are in structurally weaker positions than previously, and second, that the mediated nature of the Arab Spring protests foregrounded behavioral and identity-driven motivations. The corroborate the first assertion, I present evidence here that protest attendance is linked to increasing digital media usage in the political sphere. As stated previously, the ability of digitally-mediated movements to motivate mass protest – in organizationally weak environments and in the face of extensive security forces – helps to balance the dominance autocrats have enjoyed in the institutional and economic sphere. It renders their security forces less effective and gives elites significant incentive to abandon the autocrat. To back the second assertion, I present evidence that trust in various government institutions – a common measure of legitimacy – was significantly correlated with protest attendance. Autocrats who find themselves identified as an out-group member – perhaps a villainous strongman or a cancer in the ranks of power – they are likely to be considered illegitimate, and not to be trusted. If potential protestors can be motivated by a lack of legitimacy, a lack of trust, then it represents a significant threat to autocratic power.

In terms of operationalizing our concepts, case selection, and method of analysis, the Arab Barometer provides the most extensive ranged of public opinion data, with the largest sample sizes in the region. Yet, despite its superiority to other data sources, there exist significant roadblocks for causal analysis, as well as large amounts of missing data from various waves. For example, a key part of identifying shifts in legitimacy or digital media usage over time is the ability to view data from prior to the outbreak of Arab Spring protests in late 2010/2011. Yet, the Arab Barometer's first wave (taken in 2007) provides little leverage in terms of questions targeted at trust, and more importantly, omits key cases from its data (cases such as Egypt and Tunisia, two prominent Arab Spring countries). Similarly, cases are omitted in future waves as well. For example, data on Morocco is missing from wave 2 (taken

in 2011), and Bahrain is omitted entirely from post-Arab Spring analyses. Because of these gaps, correlation is the only real bar that we can clear with this quantitative analysis, and I am limited in options for operationalizing concepts.

Choosing cases present similar obstacles, for similar reason. Data collection is relatively inconsistent across time points, especially for those countries that experienced significant state disruption or failure in the wake of the Arab Spring. This is an important barrier, because my analysis calls for states that experienced direct protests but continued to collect public opinion data throughout the period of the uprisings. States that experienced little or no protests – such as the oil-rich states of the Gulf – offer little in terms of leverage, as these are states in which the structural conditions favoring autocracy have not changed as dramatically as in resource-poor states. Similarly, while part of the project is comparative at the state level – contrasting the experiences of varying regime types – a key aspect of the assertions above concern individual-level motivations. Monarchies experienced less intense challenges to their regimes, but they were certainly not immune to the discontent that swept the region. As such, my sample needs states with high levels of individual level variation in contentious action. Finally, while it might be useful to expand cases by including countries that recently came to resemble those of the Arab spring – namely Algeria and Sudan – all present data collection occurred significantly before protests broke out in either state. I am therefore left with the following four cases for analysis: Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. These four states have consistent data collection across three Arab Barometer Waves (2013, 2016, and 2019), and provide sufficient variation at the individual and state level to provide useful comparison. They also fall within the range of medium-income countries, with limited resource endowments. While they do have significant variation in population size, and security alliances, these are of limited relevance to my hypotheses.

I have constructed six logistic regression models with fixed-country effects and a suite of demographic controls. This model-type allows for state level comparisons due to the fixed effects, as

well as a broad analysis of individual motivations across states. In the first three of the models, I test the assertion that participation in contentious politics is related to media usage. Appendix A includes a broader description of the variable used in the analysis, as well as a list of the various demographic controls used. The dependent variable here is attendance at a sit-in, demonstration, or protest, a binary variable (hence the logistic regression model). For covariates, I test various media inputs, including regular internet, social media, and television usage, as well as more targeted variables, such as "using the internet to follow political news," or "using the internet to express political opinions." Using various measures helps to find some nuance in the broader story about the precise pathways by which media usage leads to protest participation. These variables are tested with more traditionally-understood vehicle of protest participation, namely membership in civil-society organizations or political parties.

The results from Table 1 below show the outcome of my logistic regression from three waves of Arab Barometer data. As the reader can see, broad internet usage is significantly and positively correlated with protest attendance, as is using the internet to express political opinions. Wave 5 in particular makes the case that social media is critical to the process of forming opposition identities and motivating protest. This is the first wave that targeted social media usage as separate from internet usage, and it found that internet usage alone was insignificant – unlike Wave 3 and 4 – but that increasing social media usage is strongly correlated with protest attendance. Importantly, television usage was inconsistently correlated with protest attendance, with significance in Wave 5 only. This provide some evidence to corroborate an earlier claim that television may act as an amplifier of oppositional frames (as was the case with Al Jazeera) but that much of the independent work is done on the internet, where users have more interactive experiences with their communities, and state institutions exercise less control. Together, these results provide some quantitative evidence to back the claim that protest attendance is linked to internet – and in particular, social media – usage.

TABLE 1

Correlation of Media Usage and Protest Participation			
	Dependent variable:		
	Attendance		
	(Wave 3)	(Wave 4)	(Wave 5)
Use Internet for Pol. News	0.226	0.253*	0.115
	(.180)	(.148)	(.371)
Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions	0.459***	0.647***	NA
	(.174)	(.154)	
Internet Usage (frequency)	-.117**	-.097**	.064
	(.050)	(.041)	(.050)
Social Media Usage (frequency)	NA	NA	.173**
			(048)
Television Usage (frequency)	-0.079	-0.061	.136**
	(.075)	(.046)	(.050)
Membership in CSO	.631***	1.24***	1.09***
	(.146)	(.135)	(.087)
Membership in Pol. Party	0.780**	1.01**	NA
	(.253)	(.329)	
Jordan	-2.36***	-1.58***	-1.04***
	(.183)	(.165)	(.112)
Morocco	-1.01***	.136	.876***
	(.220)	(.137)	(.116)
Egypt	-0.368***	-1.70***	-.131
	(.147)	(.182)	(.112)
Tunisia	NA	NA	NA
Constant	1.168**	0.486	1.134***
	(0.493)	(0.477)	(0.371)
Observations	4,330	4,319	5,203
Log Likelihood	-1,059.045	-1,261.282	-2,367.123
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,156.090	2,560.564	4,768.245
Note:	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<0.001		

Importantly, more traditional organizations such as political parties and CSOs were also strongly correlated, with large coefficients. This is an expected result, as these organizations can still offer experience and resources that can be useful for contentious action. However, the scale differences on the variables – combined with the widespread penetration of social media – reveals the increasing power of digital media. Organizational and party membership are binary variables, whereas the measures for internet and social media usage are ordinal variables with 5 values. The change in predicted probability of protest attendance when an individual moves from no internet/social media usage to the daily usage in Wave 3 of our results is .023, compared with the change in the probability of attendance when moving from no affiliation to affiliation with a CSO (.035) or political party (.051). The change in probabilities are more comparable when adjusting for the full-scale shift. In addition, across our cases, an average of 5.4% of the citizenry reported membership in an official organization, whereas an average of 20% reported using the internet or social media at least once or twice daily, far outweighing the remaining differences in predicted probabilities. Notably, the discrepancy between these effects is smaller in Wave 4 and Wave 5 analyses of the Arab Barometer, with organizational membership increasing among the population, and taking a greater role in motivating protest attendance. This suggests that the Arab Spring protests of 2011 leaned heavily on digital media in an organizationally scarce environment, but then may have offered a useful pathway for newly formed CSOs and political parties to recruit mobilized citizens.

There are a few other points to note about the data above**.** First, many of the theorized demographic covariates that are thought to be linked to protest attendance – not reported in Table 1 but included in Appendix A – were not significantly correlated, or weakly correlated. The narrative of unemployed students, low-income citizens, and religious organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood being large drivers of protest activity seems only weakly supported. Education was significantly related to protest attendance, but income was not, nor was status as an unemployed individual, nor religiosity.

These provide some underlying evidence that suggest methods of mobilization are arguably more important determinants of action than suspected underlying motivations.

Additionally, the correlation of the country fixed effect indicators provides some evidence for the broad claim about the reduced protest activity in monarchies, as well as some qualifications regarding the effects of leader choice and changes in leadership over time. In the fixed effects model, Tunisia was taken as the baseline country, and it displayed the most protest activity in Wave 3 (2013) relative to the other states, with Egypt close behind. Jordan and Morocco, on the other hand, were significantly less likely to see protests than either Egypt or Tunisia, reflecting the understanding of the region at the time, with Egypt and Tunisia rocked by turmoil, and Morocco and Jordan experiencing less dissent. However, by Wave 4 (2016), this trend had reversed, and Morocco in particular showed a greater tendency to protest when compared with other states, with Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan seeing less protest. This reversal shows comes during a time when the Moroccan monarchy was heavily criticized for involving itself too heavily in party politics, and following a wave of protests after security forces in the north of the country killed a fishmonger, an unusual occurrence for the country, and one that sparked significant protests against the security forces. Importantly, those protests did not target the monarch, however, and in fact were often cast as an entreaty to Mohammad VI to exercise more control over the security forces. This period will be covered in more depth in the case studies, but it suggests that monarchies are not immune to protests if they behave poorly, but again, their baseline legitimacy can help them navigate political crises more easily.

The second assertion made above is that individual motivations are more strongly linked to identity-driven, legitimacy-oriented factors, rather than economic or security concerns. Unfortunately, the Arab Barometer survey has very few options related to emotional affect concerning the regime, nor does it structure it questions on identity such that regression analysis is possible. However, a key measure of legitimacy – trust – is included in all waves of the survey for all our countries. I tested a

model including trust in the government (general), and trust in the police forces. The first stands as an imperfect proxy for trust in the leader themselves, especially considering that both in republics and monarchies, citizens often draw a distinction between the government writ large and the specific leaders. However, it is the closest approximation I have for leader trust. Similarly, the police forces are also not the leader, but they are often considered to be synonymous with the autocrat, especially in highly securitized societies such as Egypt or Tunisia (Bellin 2004). Of course, these are imperfect measures, but when compared with the limited impact of other factors that are more closely linked with structural factors (inequality, economic anxiety, lack of security, frustration with pace of reform, etc.) it provides some evidence that identity-driven factors are motivating protest across the region.

Table 2 presents the results from three more logistic regression models, with the same dependent variable of attendance analyzed. This model, however, evaluates motivational covariates, rather than methods of mobilization. The covariates of interest are trust in government, and trust in the police forces, with various alternative covariates linked to structural factors measures as well. Trust in government and police were significantly and negatively corelated with protest attendance across all three waves, indicating that as trust increases, the tendency to protest decreases. Perceptions of the economy, social inequality, lack of security, and various other structural covariates were not significantly correlated, or only occasionally correlated. In addition, perceptions of corruption in state institutions was also correlated with protest attendance in two of our three waves, and as scholars have noticed previously, corruption is generally considered to be linked to legitimacy in leadership (Haslam, Reicher, and Platow 2011).

TABLE 2

Motivations for Protest Participation			
	Dependent variable:		
	Attendance		
	(Wave 3)	(Wave 4)	(Wave 5)
Economic Anxiety	.004	0.015	.008
	(.606)	(.049)	(.325)
Lack of Security	-.004	.000	NA
	(.081)	(.072)	
Perceptions of Social Inequality	.084	.029	NA
	(.068)	(.060)	
Trust in Government	-.153*	-.113*	.087*
	(.074)	(.068)	(.042)
Trust in Police	-.190**	-.125*	.133***
	(.068)	(.063)	(.037)
Frustration with Lack of Reform	.510	.057	NA
	(.085)	(.068)	
Corruption in State Institutions	.510*	-.068	.204***
	(.226)	(.085)	(.049)
Jordan	-2.07***	-1.34***	-.681***
	(.201)	(.181)	(.107)
Morocco	-1.03***	.614***	1.30***
	(.229)	(.148)	(.109)
Egypt	-.709***	-1.49***	0.394***
	(.169)	(.193)	(.108)
Tunisia	NA	NA	NA
Constant	1.020*	-0.023	0.698**
	(0.606)	(0.540)	(0.325)
Observations	3,580	3,469	6,783
Log Likelihood	-935.394	-1,156.700	-2,954.250
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,910.789	2,355.401	5,940.501
Note:	*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<0.001

While this model presents evidence – imperfect as it is – that protest attendance is most proximately linked to trust in government and state institutions, it is also worth noting that this effect is widespread across regime type. We still see broadly the same effects from our country indicators, as we did in the model presented in Table 1, but when controlling for those factors, we still see trust issues as a key factor across all states. Again, this serves to drive home the point that monarchies are not immune to trust issues, and that these issues operate in broadly similar ways across varying regime types. However, monarchical legitimacy works to disrupt the link between digital media usage, identity-driven concerns, and protest attendance. If an individual does not trust the monarch, then they are susceptible to the oppositional frames disseminated online that target the monarch, just as those citizens are in republics.

What we are left with, then, is a puzzle. Why, if motivations for protest were broadly similar across the region, did the monarchies in the analysis experience less protests? The next section posits that the difference is the varying legitimacy of the leaders, and the affective and identity structures tying the citizens and the leader together, accounts for the more intense protests in Tunisia and Egypt, relative to Jordan and Morocco in the initial wave of Arab Spring discontent. The monarchs began the period with a greater level of baseline legitimacy, due to their credible efforts to project consistency with historicized expectations of the past leadership, their relatively less active repressive apparatuses, and their less restrictive identity structures. This process ensured that much of the citizenry felt vaguely positive, or a least neutral, affective ties to the monarch, and prevented the spread of opposition frames. The republics on the other hand suffered from historical constraints set by the examples of past nationalist leaders such as Nasser and Bourguiba, and their turn toward securitization – rather than identity-building - following the deaths of those leaders. When discontent spread then, diverse groups were able to latch onto opposition frames that set the autocrat as the villain of society, and their actions during the crises amplified the credibility of those narratives.

IV: Social identity, leadership, and legitimacy

Having established the link between increased digital media usage and the frequency of mass protest, as well as the relevance of identity mechanisms in motivating protests, I have in effect posited increased threats to autocratic leaders in the digital age. Yet, that threat was not felt uniformly across MENA countries during and following the Arab Spring. In particular, those states governed by monarchs seemed to experience less intense protests, while those governed as republics-in-name were wracked with large-scale demonstrations. The key difference in these experiences lie in the varying legitimacy of leaders, and the extent to which they are credibly identified as villainous actors in broad protest frames. Further, legitimacy is intricately tied to the structure of social identity in the leader's population, a structure that works to define the expected behavior and characteristics of a leader. Finally, due to the varying historical identity structures – monarchs are better positioned to maintain, and even innovate in, a social identity structure that positions them in a more effective affective position than leaders of nationalist republics.

Legitimacy has generally been used as a broad concept to describe the extent to which leaders are granted a "right to rule" (Hudson 1977; Haldenwang 2017) by a population. Leaders with high legitimacy are generally thought to be able to govern more effectively, provoke limited dissent, and hold a broadly positive – or at least neutral – affective attachment to the citizenry. Importantly, this process generally consists of a supply and demand mechanism, by which the leader supplies a claim to legitimate authority over a population, and the population articulates demands that describe the type of ruler they consider to be legitimate (Haldenwang 2017). Yet, for this process to function efficiently, the supplied claim of legitimacy from the ruler must be legible to the population and consistent with their demands. This double-cycle is shown in Figure 1 below, where the supplied claim is either endorsed or rejected by the population; the demands put to the ruler and then either legitimated, compensated, or repressed.

FIGURE 1: Legitimacy Cycle



SOURCE: Haldenwang 2017

Yet, what is under-theorized in this process are the varying indicators that determine whether a leader's legitimacy claim is endorsed, and whether or why they choose to either legitimate, compensate, or repress the demands of the population. On its face, a leader should want to offer a legitimacy claim that is legible to the population, but how exactly is that accomplished? What are the consequences if that claim is not credible? Similarly, the leader should want to legitimate the demands of the population, as that produces more effective leader-follower interactions and builds trust and positive affect with followers. However, what determines whether a leader is even able or willing to meet these demands? What options are available to them if they struggle to do so?

As was discovered by the leaders of various MENA states toward the end of the nationalist periods, there are certain structural barriers to being able to meet the demands of the population, especially if those demands are material in nature. The promises of a growing middle-class, social safety net, and high-quality education of the nationalist period were met with the stark realities of the region's economic weakness during the economic downturn of the 70s and 80s. The leaders of nationalist

republics tended toward a mixture of repression and compensation when their legitimacy was challenged (read: rejected according to Figure 1) and when they were unable to meet the legitimation demands of their citizenry (Bellin 2004). The monarchs outside of the oil rich gulf that had survived the nationalist period – namely Jordan and Morocco – were able to use repression more selectively, and never needed to build large security apparatuses on the scale of the presidents of the region (Anderson 1991). Given their similarities in terms of economic development/strength, we are left little to explain the variation in dissent across states, and the ability of monarchs to maintain legitimacy relative to the republicans, especially without resorting to broad repressive tactics.

Some portion of this variation may be explained by the mediation effects of social identity on the entirety of the legitimation process. The credibility of an autocrat's claim to power, the legibility of that claim to the populace, the nature of their legitimation demands, and the options available to meet those demands all operate under a broader system that ties the leader and populace together through a shared history, common culture, and group-based expectations regarding the nature of leadership and authority, all of which are encompassed under broad group identities. Autocrats to a large extent are bound by the history of their own states, which generate expectations about how a leader should act. The maintenance of a broad identity in which they are legitimate leaders depends in a large extent on their ability to embody the traits and behaviors that ground them in a historicized understanding of what it means to be a leader, a both cognitive and emotional process that operates through various symbols and cues that activate and strengthen affective ties; this is an effort in which monarchs have the upper hand over their republican counterparts. Of course, leaders have choices within those constraints, and can work to either strengthen, erode, or perhaps innovate within the social identity structure afforded them. Choices made by the autocrat prior to direct challenges to their legitimacy are crucial in building trust among citizens and diffusing – rather than amplifying - large-scale protests, which was the experience of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco. I will explore the consequences of

turning away from identity-driven projects, including the increased vulnerability of the autocrat as oppositional identities develop that locate him as the enemy of the people.

Scholars in the fields of psychology and sociology have utilized social identity theory to explain a number of political processes for decades, focusing on the ways in which individuals identify with larger groups, how groups construct in-groups and out-groups, and the implications for political behavior that follow these categorizations (Tajfel and Turner 1979**,** Turner et al. 1987). Generally, people experience more positive affect to members of their in-group (Otten and Moskowitz 2000), are more helpful toward and trusting of in-group members (Dovidio et. al 1997), and expect members of their in-group to share their attitudes and values (Robbins and Krueger 2005). Yet, while there are numerous facets of social identity theory writ large, the aspects that are most relevant for our current study are 1) the Common In-group Identity Model and 2) the Social Identity Theory of Leadership. The first helps to understand how historical differences in the experiences of the republics and the monarchies of the Arab World contribute to different identity structures, which have systematic implications for the stability and applicability of identity groups across wide swaths of society. The second helps us to understand the role – and expectations – of leaders in maintaining their position at the head of identity groups, and the implications associated with the success of those efforts, particularly for their ability to communicate effectively to group members.

The Common Ingroup identity Model (CIIM) was originally developed to understand how recategorization of various social groups under a single, superordinate group helps to promoted inter-group cooperation and reduce bias among previously distinct identity groups (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). The successful construction of a superordinate identity has been associated with effective nation-building projects as well as more robust state-society relationships (Transue 2007; Reeskens and Wright 2013). The introduction of CIIM therefore inspired numerous studies on the methods by which outside actors might intervene in inter-group conflict to foster common identities, as well as methods by

which state leaders can build legitimacy by appealing to a superordinate identity (for examples, see Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007)

Yet, the task of building a common group identity is rather complicated, and subsequent studies have pointed to the importance of the structure of a group identity when considering its stability, as well as the potentially negative outcomes associated with intervention attempts aimed at creating a common identity. First, scholars have conducted a number of studies indicating that a single, common, assimilating group identity is in fact rather unstable (Dovidio and Gaertner 2007). Derived from Brewer's (1991) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, they argue that identities that require behavioral or value assimilation comes at the expense of an individual's need to feel unique and differentiated from others within the group (Hornsey and Hogg 2000). As such, even if states construct effective common identities, it is likely that over time subordinate group identities will reemerge (Dovidio and Gaertner 2007). Second, efforts by illegitimate leaders to construct common identities – or, alternatively, efforts by legitimate leaders to incorporate groups that are seen as threatening – may instead produce negative reactions and increase intergroup bias, as well as reduce the legitimacy of leaders of identity groups (Moss 2017).

In response to these complications of CIIM, scholars have begun recently to explore the concept of dual-identity structures, under which members perceive two distinct groups under a larger, multi-faceted superordinate identity (i.e. Catholics and Protestants under the Christian identity) (Dovidio and Gaertner 2007). These identities allow for a level of distinctiveness for subgroups that is particularly desirable for minorities and underprivileged, and can avoid the issues that arise when seeking to recategorize diverse groups under one common, unified identity, particularly if that common identity denies the relevance of subgroups with which individuals strongly identify (ibid.). Counterintuitively, one study has shown that the strength of commitment to a superordinate identity is often enhanced by the perception of a strong, subordinate identity (Gonzales and Brown 2003). The explanations for this

pattern varies, but a popular consensus among scholars in this field is that common identities which require assimilation of subgroups can produce identity threat, which causes subgroup members to react negatively to assimilation efforts and in general produce a less stable superordinate identity, whereas superordinate identities that allow for a greater degree of multi-culturalism inspire stronger identification due to their ability to fulfill needs for distinctiveness amongst subgroups (Dovidio and Gaertner 2007).

Why is the CIIM relevant for our discussion of the Arab Spring protests? The nationalist projects of Egypt and Tunisia emphasized assimilative common identities (Nasserism in Egypt and Bourguiba's modernization project in Tunisia) that were set counter to more traditional religious and cultural identities, providing little space for subgroups to develop strong subordinate identities and agitating against any sort of social division. This assimilative nature not only marginalized religious identities and weakened traditional individuals' identification with the superordinate identity, but it was even unstable for more modernized groups that stood to benefit from nationalist development, particularly as severe economic inequality developed over time and the promises of modernization went unfulfilled for later generations. Mass defections from the nationalist identities in Tunisia and Egypt therefore attenuated the positive effects of a common in-group identity and set society firmly against the state as an opposition force. In contrast, Jordan and Morocco, which did not experience intense nationalist projects on the level of Egypt and Tunisia, were able to construct a more multi-faceted superordinate identity under the auspices of the monarchy, one which bridged aspects of traditional and modern cultures – particularly regarding religion – and did not require the assimilation of various subgroups. Instead, the monarchs of these nations – recalling the political structure of the Ottoman era and the Islamic empire – stood as managers of relatively multi-cultural society, above the fray, and therefore avoiding the production of identity threat among subgroups. Furthermore, the ability of the monarch to maintain the legitimacy of these founding national identities limited the strength of the opposition arrayed

against them in 2011 and lent credibility to their promises as leaders of the nation in response to protest, a credibility not afforded to Mubarak or Ben Ali.

Yet, the CIIM is only one facet of the psycho-sociological dynamics that were at play during the uprisings of 2011, and it is certainly the case that – during periods of uncertainty and instability – leaders are often able to resurrect abandoned identities in order to redirect opposition toward different targets (Kinnvall 2004). Both Mubarak and Ben Ali made direct appeals to their populations, emphasized their past association with the iconic nationalist leaders of the past, and attempted to recontextualized the strife of the 2011 period as part of the ongoing project of national development – for which they stood at the head. Therefore, we need an explanation for why the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia – despite their attempts to do so – were ineffective in their efforts to appeal to past nationalist pride in their attempts to calm protestors, whereas those of Jordan and Morocco were ultimately successful. This explanation is provided by the Social Identity Theory of Leadership (SITL), which examines the role of leaders in constructing and maintaining the national identity they are meant to represent and the implications for their leadership efforts should they fail in that pursuit.

SITL is a branch of sociological theory that developed out of social identity theory in the early 2000s (Hogg 2001; Hogg and van Knippenberg 2003), and sought to recontextualize the role of leadership as a "group-membership-based influence process" (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012), which broke from traditional studies of leadership as organizational/management process based on a social contract between leaders and followers. SITL instead focuses on the cognitive processes that individuals undergo during the development of group identities, during which they seek to identify a series of prototypical traits that define their group relative to out-groups (Haslam et. al 1995; Hogg, 2005). SITL argues that effective leaders are those that most visibly embody the traits associated with the in-group, and that the legitimacy derived from that position ensures that they are perceived as a reliable source of normative information, particularly during periods of crisis (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012). The

implication, according to a prominent scholar of this theory, is that "effective leadership rests increasingly on the leader being considered by followers to possess prototypical properties of the group" (ibid.)

The position of leaders as the archetype of identity group traits has a number of implications for politics and society, First, the embodiment of prototypical groups traits by a leader affords them a positive affect from group members and group members are significantly less likely to tolerate criticisms of the leadership by other group members (ibid.). This emotional affect lends prototypical leaders legitimacy in their position similar to that thought to be afforded to the monarchs of the Arab world. Additionally, research in this field suggest that stronger identification with a group is associated with more visible displays of conformity to group norms (Abrams and Hogg 2010), thereby giving leaders a key role in maintaining the strength of a given identity group above and beyond the influence of the rank and file or even high-ranking members that exist below the leaders (Byrne 1971; Gordon 1996). Finally, the embodiment of prototypical traits by group leaders helps follows to construct charismatic leadership personalities that further insulate them against criticisms from both in-group and out-group members (Platow et al. 2006; van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg 2005).

Second – and contingent upon the legitimacy, trust, and charisma derived from prototypicality – leaders are able to innovate and define new directions for identity groups, including incorporating previously distinct groups into a larger superordinate identity (Hogg and Reid 2006; Reicher and Hopkins 2003; Seyranian and Bligh 2008). A leader's ability to do so relies primarily on the rhetorical and communication strategies that s/he employs and the degree to which it aligns with their public behaviors (Stone et al. 1997). Importantly, this process also includes a suspension of disbelief among their followers, with highly prototypical leaders given more latitude in their action, even if their behavior is not clearly seen to serve the interests of the groups (Giessner & van Knippenberg 2008; Platow and van Knippenberg 2001; Platow et al. 2006; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg 2005). One

neuroscientific study showed the varying chemical reactions to similar statements made by prototypical leaders and out-group leaders, showing that inspirational messages by in-group leaders activated arts of the brain associated with semantic control – the process of encoding information within a larger lexicon consistent with an individual's world beliefs, strengthening confirmation bias – whereas similar statements by out-group leaders activated areas of the brain associated with reasoning and criticism (Molenberghs et al. 2017).

– in addition to sense of fit between the leader and historically-driven expectations of leadership – leaders can play an active role in the construction, maintenance, and innovation of group identities under their authority. In fact, a recent review of the psychological research associated with leadership identified trait matching – or "being one of us" – as only the first step of four in crafting an effective leader-oriented identity (Haslam, Reicher, and Platow 2011). Beyond the underlying prototypicality of a leader, they are expected to be champions of the group, to continually craft a sense of group identity, and to make that identity mean something; to demonstrate positive outcomes as a result of that identity (ibid). Importantly, and as noted by previous studies of monarchical success in the Arab Spring, monarchs adopted inclusive, cross-cutting identities that were perceived as broadly fair across diverse constituencies, a counter to the exclusive identity structures of the republics (Yom and Gause III 2012). leaders carry both antecedent factors that play a role in the level of legitimacy they enter office with - factors that I have argued favor monarch – and make choices about how to move forward with innovating and maintaining new identity structures. – the autocrats of the republics failed to innovate their identity structures toward the end of the nationalist era, choosing to excluded wide swaths of society while simultaneously lacking the underlying charisma and legitimacy that bolstered the power of the nationalist leaders prior to them.

There are consequences for leaders who are not seen as legitimately prototypical among their followers. Non-prototypical leaders – all else equal – are often associated with the weakening of the

strength of identification among group members (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012), and suspicion of unfair treatment or illegitimate practices towards in-group members has been shown to be much higher for leaders who are atypical (Cheng et al. 2009). Thus, the trust and legitimacy shown to prototypical leaders is often eroded as leaders are viewed as less prototypical. Not surprisingly, this erosion of trust has consequences for the ability of leaders to control or define the group identity, or to utilize identities as a means to influence hostile populations. Studies have shown that interventions by illegitimate leaders to define a group identity often has the effect of strengthening subordinate identities rather than inspiring obedience or superordinate identification (Moss 2017). Similarly, weakening group identities can produce anger against leaders that are seen to be the cause of group erosion, and may ultimately reverse the process cited in Molenberghs et al. (2017) above, indicating that atypical, out-group leaders may inspire more uncritical trust than illegitimate in-group leaders (Gaffney, Rast III, and Hogg 2018). Finally, leaders who are generally viewed positively in the population can credibly shift blame onto other actors who are viewed more negatively. However, if they themselves are the most high-profile, negative figure in the political consciousness, then blame is more likely to fall upon their own heads (Hameleers, Bos, and Vrees 2017; Hood 2010).

This shift in legitimacy is particularly problematic for autocrats that have traditionally been seen as synonymous with the securitized state, as they can quickly become a lightning rod for diverse opposition movements to organize around. The identification of a villain, victim, and hero is a critical part of building oppositional identities. Importantly, both villains and heroes are seen as strong and active characters within a larger moral narrative, the only difference between them being their perceived morality, whether benevolent or malevolent. Leaders may begin their careers as some version of a hero, but as they make choices that erode citizen trust, or display immoral behaviors, then they quickly become the villain of the story, one that can easily become a widespread perception through the same digital pathways we covered in the previous section.

Similarly, scholars argue that is it a relatively quick process for potential protest participants – themselves lacking broad social identifications - to "fuse" with both the victims and heroes provided by digital content (Swann et. al 2012). Fusion is a more extreme type of identification, in which the personal and the group identities – rather than competing with each other – are interwoven to the point that they are indistinguishable. This motivates more extreme action in defense of the group or individual with which a protester has fused (Swann et. al 2009; Baray et. al 2009). In particular, this process is most intense during periods of heightened emotional and physiological activity, the former existing in abundance on digital platforms, with the latter a key feature of mass protest movements. These processes imply that a leader can quickly lose control of the narrative during periods of intense state-society conflict, and to the extent that they are seen as illegitimate, become the sole target of the ire of a citizenry that has bonded strongly with characters that have cast the autocrat as illegitimate. "We are all Khalid Said" or "We are the 99%" are prime examples of the ways in which these frames can help guide unaffiliated citizens toward process of identity fusion that motivates high-risk action, even in the face of violent repression. Autocrats who find themselves on the outside of this identity-formation process – as experienced by the likes of Mubarak and Ben Ali, among others– are left with little option to quell protests, as any increase in activity on their part, or attempts to restore legitimacy, only motivate more intense opposition.

The focus here has revolved primarily around the autocrat, rather than the various groups and institutions that underpin his power. Why, for example, was anger at Mubarak or Ben Ali so severe, but did not transfer to their associates in the military? With the exception of Mohammad Morsi, each successive leader of Egypt following Mubarak's ouster has been a close associate of the fallen dictator, and the military itself is critical to maintaining autocratic power in the country. Similarly, while there was a concerted push to keep the former members of Ben Ali's party – the RCD – out of government in Tunisia, the most recent Tunisia president hailed from the same party, and one of the most powerful

parties in the Tunisian legislature is made up almost entirely of past RCD members. What explains the failure of the anger to transfer from the dictator to others?

This dynamic provides further justification for the psychological analysis of mass protests in the region, and the importance of personalization and character construction in opposition framing. Scholars of autocracy have noticed an overall trend toward personalization of autocratic regimes over the last few decades, particularly in the MENA region (Geddes et. al 2018). While this is cast as a survival mechanism in analyses of autocracy, it also functions to place them as the most available and most powerful representation of the regime. In a digital era that operates on various cognitive heuristics – the availability heuristic among them (Weyland 2012) – it is no surprise that the autocrat is the clear target of opposition ire. In particular, the human dimension of the autocrat – distinct from larger, more anonymous organizations like the military – triggers more intense behavioral responses that are more likely to include empowering emotions such as anger or outrage, rather than disempowering emotions associated with more distant group power structure (Muller and Kappas 2010). The structure of digital media in these protests provides opposition with characters in a narrative, characters more easily contained within persons than in organizations. The autocrat is clearly the villain in these narratives, and while various other individuals and organizations might be associated with him, they tend to be categorized as minions, inspiring less direct hatred – or threat – due to their perceptibly limited power (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018). Overall, the point here is that, due to the psycho-social nature of the mass protests in the region, the autocrat is particular is vulnerable to opposition targeting, due to his availability and perceived power. Some portion of that might be transferred to other groups or individuals, but that often muddles the narrative, and operates under distinctly different affective patterns that may not work to unify mass movements.

An identity-drive analysis of leadership and contentious movements in the MENA region thus imply that the inability of a leader to legitimately represent prototypical group traits has the effect of

weakening identification and inspiring alternative opposition narratives that they cannot control. This simultaneously increases the vulnerability of the autocrat, supplies opposition with a clear villain in their protest framing, and severely attenuates – if not reversing altogether – the efficacy of leaders to communicate with their population during times of crisis. By turning to specific case studies in the next section, I will argue that the different experiences of monarchies and republics stems from the differing affective and identity structures inherent in their varying regime structures, as well as the specific history of individual autocrats. The late republican dictators of Tunisia and Egypt were bound by an obligation to embody an arguably unrealistic set of personality traits derived from a near-hagiographic conceptualization of nationalist leaders of the past, leaders who were foundational to the national identities of their respective states. Their inability (or unwillingness) to embody these traits, combined with negative outcomes in the socio-economic sphere, served to weaken the already unstable assimilative identities their predecessors passed on to them. Over time, their consistent and visible subversion of this identity – made more visible by public criticism – inspired anger against the leaders and produced a group identity aligned in opposition to their leadership, effectively recategorizing these leaders as out-group members. Thus, their efforts during the uprisings to quell protests by offering reform and appealing to the need for national unity backfired, reinforcing their image as an illegitimate medium of communication and cementing themselves as the target of national ire. In contrast, the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco were not so bound by expectations to be transformative, world-beating nationalist leaders, drawing instead on conceptualizations of monarchical rule were closer to administrative rulers of the Ottoman Empire, a far easier set of traits to embody than those transmitted by Nasser in Egypt or Bourguiba in Tunisia. Over time, their public efforts to reinforce their image as group leader - and to incorporate newer, modern identities – afforded them the legitimacy that scholars observe in the monarchies of the modern Arab world. Thus, during the protest of 2011, their offers of

reform were seen as legitimate communication by the leader to address in-group issues, and inspired obedience – or at least, demobilization – rather than indignation and anger.

V: Case studies

This section provides a brief discussion of the historical development of national identities in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan in order to show the processes of social identity theory at work in these nations. This is not meant to be a rigorous case study, but more an effort at bringing more abstract concepts into a more concrete narrative. Mubarak and Ben Ali inherited an assimilative, unstable national identity that carried leadership expectations that they were both unwilling and unable to emulate. This led to the weakening of their position as national leaders as well as the superordinate Egyptian/Tunisian identities, and damaged their ability to effectively demobilize protests in 2011. The monarchs on the other hand inherited a more complex national identity that was 1) more stable and 2) had effectively incorporated both modern and traditional social groups (Anderson 1991). In addition, the monarchs were invested with more realistic expectations in terms of the traits they were meant to embody, enabling them to maintain their positions at the head of a legitimate superordinate identity group. Thus, when communicating to protestors in 2011, they were able to demobilize significant numbers through the promise of reform. Importantly, shifts in the post-Arab Spring period show that successive leaders may be able to reestablish a claim to legitimacy, either through serious efforts at reform (as is the case in Tunisia), or by appealing to a newly unsettled/threatened sector of society (as was the case in Egypt). Similarly, autocrats may weaken their legitimacy if they take actions deemed unsuitable to their station (as in Morocco), though again, preexisting positive affect may help to shift blame onto other state actors, and allow the autocrat to retain most of their authority (as in Jordan).

Egypt

Gamal Abdel Nasser is perhaps the most well-known Arab leader of the 20th century, and certainly the most famous Arab nationalist in the international arena. Rising to prominence in 1952 as

part of the Free Officers coup d'état, he became prime minister in in 1954, forcing the resignation of then-Naguib, who had intentions to align more closely with the established political forces of the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood (Kandil 2014). He would later ascend to the presidency in 1956. After initially seeking to merge Islamism with Socialism through his manipulation of the willing ulema of Al-Azhar mosque, he later abandoned that project in favor of a pure Socialist agenda fueled by state control over the economy (Aburish 2004, 203-4), and later had the rebellious leader of the Muslim Brotherhood – Sayyid Qutb – executed on dubious charges of planning to assassinate him (ibid. 238-9). From that point on, he pursued a Pan-Arabist, secular project of nation building that saw Egypt challenge powerful international forces on the issues of the Suez Canal and Israel, as well as marginalizing Islamist forces at home.

Most relevant for our study is the way in which Nasser sought to define a new direction for Egypt that was increasingly secular and socialist, one that delegitimized politics based upon alternative cultural models, particularly Islam, and actively repressed challenges to his regime from that quarter (Jankowski 2001, 37). Some even argue that this relentless push for national unity was driven by his own personal identity crises early in life (ibid. 39), but however he came to it, Nasser went to great lengths to define an Arab-Egyptian identity as a secular, socialist group that did not recognize the value of ethnic diversity or religious values as political organizing principles, famously arguing that "for the Muslim is a human being before he is a Muslim" (ibid. 38). Importantly, Nasser was also socially conservative and distinctly Arab in his identity, and agitated against the Western cosmopolitanism that characterized his successor, Anwar Sadat (ibid.). Thus, despite a political ideology that sought to keep religious organizations out of politics, he still was seen to embody traits that were classically Arab, including an adherence to Islamic principles in his daily life (Osman 2010).

Consequently, the image that Nasser presented to the world was one of totalizing Arab unity, based on secular, socialist economic policies but simultaneously invoking the social character of the

Arab strongman associated with earlier tribal warlords. He reinforced his position as leader of this identity group with moderately successful economic policies (in the early years) and a number of highly visible international move, most notably his confrontation with the British over the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Over time, his followers began to call themselves Nasserists, a term he opposed, but one which reflected the degree to which he had cemented himself as the archetype of Arab identity both in Egypt and abroad (Aburish 2004, 203). Notably, this initial legitimacy insulated him against future economic problems and military defeat, with supporters going so far as the publicly refute the announcement of his resignation following the catastrophic Six Day War of 1967 (Kandil 2012, 84).

Yet, this image of Egypt as a resurgent nationalist force on the international scene was inherently untenable in the context of regional geo-politics. This was a situation recognized by his successor Anwar Sadat who, following Nasser's death, began a project of De-Nasserization that included releasing political prisoners, rewriting school textbooks, and ultimately reaching a peace agreement with Israel, an event that was viewed both at home and abroad as a betrayal of the Pan-Arabism that Nasser had promoted (Cull, Culbert, and Welch 2003, 18). Though these represented savvy political moves in the structural arena – given the economic weakness of Egypt and the ascendancy of the Pro-Israel international sphere - they eroded the degree to which Egyptians identified with the national project began by Nasser, and breathed life into a marginalized opposition that had never been part of the larger superordinate identity under Nasser. This, combined with the public's view of Sadat as a Western cosmopolitan, resulted in his death at the hands of Islamist assassins and the election of Hosni Mubarak as head of the Egyptian government.

Though Mubarak had already inherited a broken national identity from Sadat, he did little to rebuild that identity in subsequent years, due likely to the military's unwillingness to again cede so much power to a given individual. Yet, seeing a revived Islamist opposition, Mubarak dramatically expanded the power of the internal security forces of Egypt and cracked down on any opposition forcefully,

leading to a further erosion of the trust between state and society in Egypt, and cementing his position as the source of ire for opposition activists (Osman 2010, 170). Similarly, allegations of personal corruption and efforts to install his son as a supposed successor were seen as further subversions of the promises made by the new Egypt in the mid-20th century (ibid.). This was reinforced by criticism over time that sought to further deride the personal traits of the Egyptian leader, as novel activists attacked his personal appearance, his military credentials, and his double-sided position on Israel (Khraidy 2016). Taken together, these actions ensured that Mubarak was no longer a legitimate representative of a broken national identity, and in fact had – over time – become a source of ire for a newly forming opposition identity that would eventually unite both liberal and Islamist elements of Egypt (Gause III 2011). It should therefore come as no surprise that his efforts to calm protestors in 2011 were ineffective. Mubarak addressed his citizens on February 10th 2011, during which he promised reforms, swore off his participation in future presidential elections, and with tears in his eyes, recounted the pain he felt for the lost eminence of Egypt since the Nasser years (Youtube). His announcement was met with ire, his tears with laughter, and days later he was removed from office.

Thus, bound by the mistakes of his past, Mubarak had weakened his ability to effectively divide the population between secular and religious groups, a move that had been successful in the past. Unfortunately, both groups had come to truly despise his leadership, and they were united in their opposition to him. However, subsequent events reveal the extent to which the underlying perceptions of the citizenry can shift over time, and the extent to which different psychological states can shift citizen preferences for leadership, or make them more receptive to past legitimacy claims that they may have sought to throw off. In particular, the narrow election of Mohammad Morsi – one driven largely by populations outside of large cities – drove a wedge between the secular and religious elements of the opposition movement. Morsi may have fit an Islamist image of leadership, especially in his challenges to the secular state, but he simultaneously violated the expectations of the secular coalition that had

helped overthrow Mubarak. In Morsi was the materialization of years and years of government warnings about the threat of Islamist leadership, and each move he made consolidate power in the presidency and push Egypt toward Islamic governance activated the fears of the secular coalition.

Morsi himself perhaps recognized the dangers the secular coalition presented for his government. A year into office, he gave a public address admitting numerous "mistakes" in his first year, and pointedly praising the army, which had been viewed as a guarantor of stability during periods of crisis in the last few years. However, the affective patterns constructed by his previous rhetoric were clear: Morsi was a threat to the freedoms of secular Egyptians. By fall of 2013, there were intense protests against Morsi's leadership, protests during which the army was called upon to restore order and protect the modest gains made during the uprising. While it is an oft-criticized institution, the army has been central to Egypt's national identity from the years of Nasser, and for many Egyptians, their connection to the army was familial, with recruitment drawing from a broad base of Egyptian society. Thus, When the army overthrew Morsi in November 2013, rather than label in the coup that it was, large portions of secular Egypt hailed it as a second revolution, and in Sisi – a previous Mubarak associate- they had a reiteration of Nasser, an image made robust by glowing reports of Sisi's interactions with everyday Egyptians. In addition, Sisi constructed a narrative parallel to that of Nasser, a military official seizing control of a listing ship, and righting it in the name of a better Egypt.

The post Arab Spring experience of Egypt serves to underline the psychological components of legitimate authority, components themselves that are subject to quick change in the midst of chaotic social conditions. Previous to the Arab Spring, a stagnating Egypt sought the removal of a military leader who had degraded the office. Yet, in 2013, they sought comfort in a military leader that could restore order to their politics. Similarly, acts of violence by the regime that might have sparked outrage during the Arab Spring were routinely ignored in the early Sisi period. This is largely because initial crackdowns focused on Islamists, protesting Sisi's rule and the removal of Morsi. At that point, however, identities

had shifted in Egypt, and those Islamists that might have been with secularists in 2011 now represented a threat to the life of secular Egyptians. This shift ensured that these crackdowns, which were far more brutal and violent than any during the Arab Spring – and perhaps, the Mubarak era generally – would go unremarked by wide swaths of the population. Sisi had, once again, divided and conquered the Egyptian people.

The lesson of the Egyptian example points to the variability of psycho-social factors that drive patterns of identity, especially as they progress through periods of varying political stability. Given Mubarak's long reign, affective attitudes toward his leadership were largely set, and difficult to adjust. Sisi, on the other hand, was able to manipulate the insecurity of a post-2011 Egypt to refashion himself as a hero figure, cast against the villainous Morsi. These largely reflect recent neuro-scientific research on emotion and anxiety, with their broad affective patterns interrupted by specific, intense, and volatile periods during which emotions catalyze and shift. Whether Sisi himself continues to the be the benefactor of this shift remains to be seen. His popularity soared in his early reign, but has since waned on the back of a broadly repressive campaign against wide sectors of Egyptian society, and his base is beginning to show signs of agitation. He would likely do well to heed those rumblings, and the legitimation demands associated with them.

Tunisia

The experience of Ben Ali in Tunisia parallels that of Mubarak in Egypt. Tunisia's nationalist leader, Habib Bourguiba, led the struggle for independence for Tunisia, during which he was labeled, the "Supreme Combatant," and served as Tunisia's first president from 1957-87. During that time, Bourguiba developed an intense cult of personality, due in large part to his success as military fighter and to his implementation of relatively successful economic development projects that would dramatically alter the social and educational landscape of Tunisia.

Key to his project to construct a modern Tunisia was Bourguiba's marginalization of the religious establishment, and his whole-hearted adoption of Western (read, French) style education and legal structures. He drove Islamist organizations underground, and went even further in attempts to eradicate religiosity in general from the public, once famously drinking a glass of orange juice on public television during Ramadan in an exhortation to the public to abandon fasting (Abderrahim 1989). This was reflection of his vision of a modern Tunisia, which explicitly blamed the traditional Tunisia culture – primarily its religiosity – for the underdevelopment it suffered in the 20th century (ibid.). That said, his economic and educational programs were quite successful relative to the experience of other Arab polities, and a significant sector of Tunisians adopted his modern national identity, looking towards Europe, rather than Levant, for their social model (ibid.). Thus, as was the case with Nasser, Bourguiba cemented a unified, totalizing national identity that placed himself at the head, as a war-hero of the independence movement and modern reformer shepherding Tunisia into the modern world. Importantly, this effort did not respond to broad legitimation demands of religious parts of Tunisia, but his modernization project was hailed as a boon to an economically struggling society, and as such stood as a compensation for legitimation demands, rather than a full recognition of them. Moreover, by linking the choice of participation in modernization to increased welfare, his project effectively siloed dissent within the hyper-religious of Tunisian society, who were ideologically motivated enough to reject those promises in favor of principles, but represented relatively few in number.

Though it took a long time for Islamists to reemerge and present a challenge to the Tunisian state, Bourguiba himself made moves that eroded his legitimacy later in life. As his health declined and his economic projects faltered, Tunisians began to protest the lack of political reform that they saw as part and parcel of the modernization project that he himself championed (Belkhodja 1998). Similarly, clientelism became rampant as he lost control of his political underlings and frustration with his regime

grew. By the time he was removed from power by Ben Ali, he had already done significant damage to the national identity he had helped to forge.

Ben Ali failed to revitalize the support afforded Bourguiba during his presidency. After executing a coup d'état during which he cited Bourguiba's failing health as a cause of the problems in Tunisia's politics. Yet, during his early days in office he did little to address the issues that most frustrated Tunisians, particularly the problem of rigged elections. He began to be associated more with the later days of Bourguiba's reign, where rampant corruption and self-serving behavior was the norm, behavior that was frequently criticized in contrast to that of Bourguiba (Cavatorta and Haugbolle 2012). Over time the extravagant corruption exhibited by his wife and extended family, which frequently raided state coffers to finance large houses, expensive trips, and highly visible parties further reinforced the public image of Ben Ali as a corrupt, self-serving autocrat (Anderson 2011). He responded to this criticism by severely reducing the freedom of the press, and move seen as a betrayal of the modern identity forged by Bourguiba, and limped through the middle years of his presidency with a moderately successful economy (Dickovick 2008). However, as the economy slowed in the last decades before his demise, and the gap between the rich and poor increased, youth found themselves out of jobs, and his corruption continued unabated, he soon became the target of opposition ire. HIs subsequent efforts to reshuffle his cabinet, the promise of thousands of new jobs, and the dismissal of hated governors in problem areas were ignored by protestors, and Ben Ali fled the country weeks later.

Thus, as is the case in Egypt, we observe the erosion of a foundational national identity that was established by a strong leader, and later subverted by future political events. In the case of Tunisia, this subversion was less a function of political constraints, and more a result of decisions by Bourguiba himself and his successor, but the eventual result was the same. Tunisians across the hinterland of the country, previously staunch supporters of the economic development that had employed them in manufacturing, began to foster alternative identities, based largely on their religious communities**.** Even

on the coast the broken promises of political pluralism and freedom of speech, as well as the eroding efficacy of Tunisia education in the international economy, caused mass disillusionment with the previously strong Tunisian identity; an identity that was eventually reinvigorated through opposition to Ben Ali himself.

Again, the post Arab Spring period in Tunisia offers lessons on how governments may reconstitute their legitimacy following crises. In this instance, rather than reinvigoration social division of the past, the Tunisian leadership responded to legitimation claims with validation. In the first instance, they made significant and true democratic reform to their state, a move that they were structurally well-positioned to make, but a bold one nevertheless. In the interim, an interesting dynamic has developed in Tunisian politics in which protests serve as a regular vehicle for expressing dissent among the population (Berman 2018). Rather than respond to these protests with violence, subsequent regimes have instead bent to the demands of protestors on numerous occasions. The most notable of these instances was the government response to the sustained protests in 2013, levied against the dominance of the Islamist party Ennahda in Tunisia elections. There were a number of factors that prompted these demonstrations, including the rise of Islamic radicalism in the country and a series of high-profile assassinations of secular leaders. Rather than respond to these protests in the way Morsi might have, a more moderate Rached Al-Ghannouci responded by promising that Ennahda's coalition would step down. He handed over government authority to Beji Caid Essebsi, a previous Ben Ali associate who led a technocratic party staffed largely with previous members of Ben Ali's party. Yet, Ghannouci had recognized the shifting landscape of identification, and rather than weaken his political position by responding in a way that would confirm the prejudices of protester, he instead defused it by validating their demands.

Jordan

The foundational narrative of the Jordanian monarchy is far different than the experiences of nationalism in Egypt and Tunisia, and those differences have contributed to the monarch's ability to build and maintain a relatively stable national identity that is at once multi-faceted and firmly establishes the monarch as the head of the superordinate identity group, above tribal, religious, and ethnic subordinate identities. Modeling themselves in part after the religious rulers of the Arabian peninsula – from whence the Hashemite family came – and in part after the administrators of the colonial period, the monarchs have been able to walk a fine line of traditional and modern legitimacy that lends them credibility during times of crises and prevents direct challenges to their rule, largely through the structure of the identity they have built in Jordan and the traits they embody as its leaders.

From the beginning, the appointment of the Hashemite dynasty as rulers of Jordan by Winston Churchill was seen by many as the establishment of an outsider ruler by colonial powers (which, of course, it was). However, in a land rocked by tribal divisions and dealing with the influx of Palestinians from the Arab-Israeli war of 1952, the impartiality of the monarch was seen as a benefit (Ryan 2018, 97). From the beginning, the monarchy could present itself as a unifying force bringing together a surprisingly diverse set of communities, denying none of them – at least initially (ibid.). Importantly, Hussein was not expected to be a military leader or to transform Jordanian society in the way that the nationalists of Egypt and Tunisia had. Instead, the Hashemite – invested with historical religious and tribal authority – were tasked with maintaining a balance between existing social groups. That said, Abdullah I was plagued by the issue of Palestine and Israel, and at the founding of modern Jordan there were numerous Palestinian militants that strongly opposed Abdullah's moderate nature, and feared he would sign a peace treaty with Israel. This fear eventually led to his assassination in 1951.

Yet, despite a rocky start to Jordanian independence, Abdullah's grandson Hussein took power as both a representative of religious, tribal Arabia and as a liberal reformer intent on bringing Jordan

into the modern world, beginning with the institution of democratic elections in 1956. Unfortunately, continuing unrest in the Palestinian community, and the disastrous Six Day War waylaid those plans, and for a long period in the mid 20th century, Jordan was under martial law, and agitated increasingly against Palestinian identities in Jordan **(**Ryan 2018, 96). While the Palestinian threat was sufficient excuse for East Bank Jordanians to forgo elections for some time, the expulsion of Palestinian militants from Jordan and the renunciation of West Bank control in 1988 to some extent settled the Palestinian question in Jordan, and the increasingly dire economic situation led to mass protests in 1989, and the reopening of parliament shortly after (Lucas 2012).

Key to our study, however, was the way in which Hussein, and his son Abdullah II after him, has been able to serve as a balancing force between East Bank Jordanians, consistently aware of the threat posed to their identity and political power, as well as – to the extent he was able – integrating Palestinian communities into Jordanian society, all the while providing various outlets for groups to pursue their interests – East Bankers in the parliament and Palestinians/Islamists in economy and society (Ryan 2018, 98). Though Hussein sought to suppress the Palestinian identity in the political sphere, the political opening of 1989 ignited very public debates on the role of Palestinians in Jordan, and to this day the Palestinian identity remains alive and well, with Palestinian having served a key role in the development of the Jordanian economy (ibid. 101). As such, Jordanian national identity has come to approximate the more complex identities seen as more stable, where superordinate identities are reinforced by strong subordinate identities as the tribal, ethnic, and religious level (ibid).

In Hussein's son, Abdullah II, the various sub-groups of Jordan have each found in him traits representative of their specific identity group. He maintains religious authority through his association with the lineage of the Prophet Mohammad and has successfully coopted the Salafi community and parts of the Muslim Brotherhood into his larger political project (Wagemakers 2016). He maintains his tribal credibility both through the continued political preference offered to tribal leaders in parliament

and his association as a military leader – of which tribal members make up the majority – an image that he maintains through many public appearances in uniform and involvement in some military actions. For the burgeoning cosmopolitan class in Jordan, Abdullah's education in Britain, Western mother, business suits, and economic liberalization projects have reinforced his image as a modern ruler. Finally, for the Palestinians, Abdullah's marriage to Palestinian-Jordanian, Queen Rania, as well as his support for a private economy in which Palestinians are dominant, has given them something to identify with as well. Of course, he is rarely forced to extremes in his embodiment of these various traits. In fact, doing so would be highly detrimental to the health of the Jordanian identity as a whole, as it would likely produce identity threat among other groups who were not part of his performance. Thus, absent the expectations generated by nationalist movements, he has been able to successfully embody the desired traits of various sub-groups in Jordan. This, combined with the historic stability of Jordan relative to the other parts of the Arab world (a distinct out-group), has reinforced his legitimacy as the leader of Jordan and consolidated the Jordan identity is a manner that does not require sub-group assimilation (Tobin 2012)

Yet, Jordan still suffers from severe economic and political constraints due to it resource-poverty and geo-political position, and the fortunes of a number of key subgroups have waned over the years. Chief among them are the tribal groups, which have seen their economic situation deteriorate significantly, a trend they see as a betrayal of the contract upon which their support of the monarchy rests (Ryan 2018, conclusion). However, when confronted with protests made up largely by tribal members, Abdullah was able to act as a credible communicator, offering political reforms that would have the greatest effect on the tribal members themselves, and repeatedly emphasizing the need for stability, an exceptional trait enjoyed by Jordan and one appreciated both by the tribes and those involved in the private economy (Tobin 2012). Rather than inspiring further ire, Abdullah had put in the

work previously to maintain his position as legitimate leader of the Jordanian identity, and thus was able to lead effectively during a period of crisis.

Years on from the Arab Spring protests, Jordan still faces economic and security issues, and King Abdullah II has been forced to juggle a series of demands placed upon the government. Most notable among them are the protests that broke out in early 2019 in response to a taxation bill included under a broad austerity program, one endorsed by Abdullah himself. The ensuing discontent actually exceeded the numbers of the Arab Spring protests in 2013, and forced the resignation of a recently elected prime minster, as well as the dissolution of the Jordanian parliament. Yet, as observers have noted, the king was largely able to avoid during this period, even though the subsequent prime minister reintroduced largely the same tax bill – and protests broke out again (Williamson 2018). Again, protests targeted a specified elite class that the new prime minister is a part of, yet that prime minister was appointed by the king, and his appointment reflected a shift in attitude by the king toward a capitalist Ammani class, and away from his tribal base. Yet, blame tends to fall on the those who are viewed negatively by the blamers, and it seems clear that Abdullah had done enough to retain the affective connection with a wide enough swath of the citizenry. That said, scholars have noted that a new generation of tribal Jordanians, their affective ties to the regime made weaker by their limited experiences, made sow the seeds for an eventual challenge to the monarchy in the future (Ryan 2018).

Morocco

The experience of Morocco was similar to that of Jordan, in that it was founded on a Hashemite monarchy that claimed a lineage descended from Prophet Mohammed. In fact, the title of the monarch has long been "Commander of the Faithful." This, combined with the long history of monarchy that has recognized distinct ethnic and social groups in the kingdom, provided a base for building a complex identity that could incorporate the traditional groups of Morocco. As previously cited, the monarchy has

maintained its religious authority through numerous public displays meant to reflect the master-disciple relationship common to the unique religious history of Morocco (Hammoudi 1997). Additionally, it utilized the resources of French occupation to coopt Berber tribes – previously hostile to the monarchy – into its identity structure pre-independence (Clark 2018, 67).

It is important to note that early on the days of independence, the monarchy suffered from legitimacy problems from more modern movements, particularly the nationalists who viewed the king as a supporter of rural and traditional authorities (ibid). This lack of legitimacy encouraged King Hassan II to rely increasingly on the military to repress urban political forces (ibid, 68; Willis 2012, 83). Yet as corruption became rampant within the monarchy and rural elites saw the king's efforts at democratization as having the potential to erode their political power, the military attempted coups in 1971 and 1972 (Willis 2012, 90; Sater 2010, 36; Storm 2007, 32). Thus, as long as the king relied too heavily on one social group over another, he struggled to construct a Moroccan national identity for which he could be an effective leader for significant portions of the population.

This situation changed following the coups of the 1970s, as the king sought to expand his base of support to more urban political groups. Beginning with the institution of democratic elections and the easing of repression, Hassan II then embarked upon a project designed to coopt the nationalist movement into his coalition. He achieved this through a series of public nationalizations for foreign businesses (Clark 2018, 70), the institution of a number of social programs aimed at increasing human development (ibid 71), and the public campaign to reclaim the Western Sahara, which effectively united diverse sectors of Moroccan society (ibid.). Hassan was able to succeed in this project through the use of phosphate rents, which allowed him to implement populist economic projects and buy off elites simultaneously (ibid 72).

Yet, as phosphate prices dropped and the economic health of large sectors of the Moroccan economy dipped, the king struggled to maintain his coalition, and riots ensued in the 1980s over the

price of bread. However, rather than resort to repression, the monarchy responded with further political liberalization that portrayed itself as reformer to social groups, while simultaneously coopting a civils society elite into a loyalist position within the state structure, an effort that resulted in the appearance of political pluralism without the political reality of a legitimate opposition (ibid. 73). Similarly, the decentralization efforts of the monarchy in the late 20th century effectively shifted the blame for negative policies to local political actors, and recast the monarch as a political fixer that could appear during times of crises and reverse the outcomes caused by local actors (ibid 154). This pattern continued into the reign of Mohammad VI, with Mohammad additionally casting himself as a leader unwilling to use repression on his people, a characteristic that remained a dark hallmark of Hassan II's rule and further cemented the image of the monarchy as a flexible, consultative institution. This was a critical shift for Mohammad VI, as a recent study have shown that descendants of those who were repressed in Morocco during Hassan II's rule were far more likely to participate in protests against the regime, and to mobilize their connections toward the same goal (Lawrence 2017).

Key to the Moroccan experience is the degree to which appearances, rather than political realities, drove outcomes among the citizens of Morocco. The monarchy was able to construct a pluralistic, cross-cutting coalition of supporters through selective incentives and material payoffs, yet the image presented to the public was one of a leader committed to true political pluralism, one that stood against corruption at the local level, and one that could serve as a shepherd of Moroccan society as it developed. These images were reinforced by a number of public demonstrations of the traits expected of monarch and served to hide the hard political maneuvering occurring behind the scene. It is therefore no surprise that – when confronted with political opposition in 2011 – a significant segment of the protestors in Morocco saw his offers of reform as consistent with the image of the monarch as a consultative political fixer, representing diverse sectors of the Moroccan society, rather than a representation of the hard political strategy that had been hidden well by the state over the years. This

identity, enabled by the history of monarchy in Morocco and the political maneuverings of Hassan II, enhanced the legitimacy of Mohammad VI as a representative of the Moroccan identity, and enabled him to influence opposition by recalling the traits expected by population.

As stated previously, however, monarchies are not immune to shifts in trust, particularly if the breach is associated with behavior that is seen to extend beyond the expectations that citizens have for a position of authority. Mohammad VI discovered this in 2011, when, in a effort to exert more direct control over the legislature in Morocco (as well as the rewrite of the constitution), threw his support behind the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), resulting in significant backlash from the Moroccan citizenry, and a dismal election-day showing for the PAM. The PAM had previously been criticized as the king's party, and the king's involvement in the electoral politics of Morocco was seen as an overreach by Mohammad VI (Speigel 2015). This is consistent with our earlier discussion of character work, in which individuals are more likely to be considered heroes to the extent that they remain relatively passive, activating in response to threats rather than in pursuit of their own interests. In this scenario, the king became active not in response to an identified threat, but instead to help shore up his own political power, enhancing the efficacy of the villain trope.

Despite stumbling the king had regained some legitimacy by the time protests broke out in Al-Hoceima in 2016, over the death of a fishmonger by security forces. Protest were met with harsh repression from local forces, and threatened to overwhelm the country. However, in this instance, Mohammad VI refrained from choosing sides, or taking the opportunity to back political allies. Instead, he harshly criticized the actions of security forces, and the government of that region, in fact forcing the resignation of the top PAM officials in the region and in the central government. While protests continued to rage on, they never reached the point of blaming the king, nor did they spread so far as to engulf wider Moroccan society. Instead, Mohammad VI crafted the image of the protests within the historical discontent of the Rif region in Morocco, where the protests originated, one that fit squarely

within the broader national narrative of Moroccan politics, within which the position of the Rif is widely recognized and understood. More importantly, the king was once again seen as responding to a crisis, a model more consistent with the hero narrative, and targeting the actions of the villains (government leadership) in their response.

In summation, the above case studies were meant to provide a narrative example of some of the more abstract concepts that were discussed in the previous section on identity in leadership, as well as a demonstration of some of the effects of autocrat behavior within the context of the Arab Spring uprisings. In the first two cases, we saw a pair of dictators that inherited unstable and flailing nationalist projects, sparking severe social resistance early in their reigns. In response, they sought to divide and conquer, manipulating the fears of a secular portion of the population by targeting Islamist political movements. While this strategy was initially successful, the expansion of repressive tactics, personalization of power, and increasingly immoral public behavior of Ben Ali and Mubarak eroded the wider modernist-identity projects the previous leaders had attempted to build, and expanded the perception of the autocrat as a bad actor to wide swaths of society; their personal security forces and subservient legislatures further aligned their images with that of a powerful, active villain that soon became seen as the root of all problems in the country. Thus, with the expansion of digital media usage, and the ability of that technology to construct and mobilize an oppositional community united around common hatred of the leader, the autocrats in those states were left highly vulnerable to challenges to their authority, and ill-equipped to handle them when they came.

The experience of monarchies, on the other hand, consisted of a less transformative, perhaps more stable identity structure inherited via familial descent, which afforded them a baseline legitimacy attached to a cultural history, one that they cultivated extensively and innovated upon when required. As such, they have maintained a broadly positive – or at least neutral – emotional valence with the population. Importantly, their formal position above the political fray and limited, selective repression

tactics have ensured that their profile more readily fits that of the hero – a potential, less active power – rather than that of the villain, an active, consistent oppressor.

VI: Conclusion

I have argued here that – in an increasingly digitized world – that autocratic strength relies more heavily on their legitimacy and the underlying identity structures that support their claim to power. In particular, monarchies of the MENA region were better positioned to confront the mass mobilization of the Arab Spring uprisings. This variation stems from a number of sources, including the structure of monarchical government, its connection to both modern and traditional cultural models, its stabler identity structures, and the work of modern monarchs to maintain and innovate within those structures over time. In contrast, the republics of the MENA region inherited an unstable, assimilative identity structure from the nationalist era, one that they initially failed to embody, and then chose to ignore in favor of increasing securitization, institutional dominance, and economic power. The result was that republican autocrats were left vulnerable to the influence of digital media, where opposition frames casting them as villains found broad, deep resonance with diverse sectors of society, encouraging mobilization on a scale that was powerful enough to the drive the leaders out of office.

This shift in the composition of autocratic strength has implications for both dictators and regimes going forward. First, it implies an inherent danger in the personalization strategies that most leaders have adopted in the modern era (Geddes et. al 2018). Personalization might be an effective strategy for staving off the threat posed by the political elite (Svolik 2012), and indeed, it may be a useful tool for constructing a national identity around charismatic leadership, as was the case for Nasser and Bourguiba. However, it may also act as a double-edged sword as that charisma fades, or as the autocrat exhibits traits and behaviors that subvert the narrative of power they have constructed; as the autocrat becomes more powerful and active, they are more easily cast as villains in oppositional narratives, acting as a common lightning rod around which organizationally-weak opposition might mobilize.

Of course, the decisions an autocrat make in the effort to keep or consolidate power are not always obvious, and should not be treated as such. With hindsight, we might criticize Mubarak or Ben Ali for failing to ignore the long-term implications of their actions, but in the moment they surely felt bound by international economic and security structures, and threatened by the potential power of radical political elements and the elite alike. As such, the decision to turn away from the nationalist projects of previous eras, and to pursue a divide-and-conquer/compensate strategy, rather than attempt to reconstitute their legitimacy, seemed like a savvy move. Indeed, it worked for decades in both cases. The major thrust of this report, however, is the claim that underlying structural conditions have changed, and issues of identity and behavior have taken on increasing relevance for autocratic stability. Whereas the common consensus of autocratic scholars were that the largest threat to a dictator was the elite with which they surround themselves (Svolik 2012), it seems increasingly likely that those same threats are intertwined with the perceptions of the masses, that a potential coup d'état may hinge on the extent to which the masses will believe the autocrat a villain, and whether they will support a heroic challenger to that authority. Those who continue to ignore identity in the political realm may find themselves the targets of strong, quickly mobilized opposition.

However, these changes may not necessarily imply that autocratic *regimes* are in the same type of danger that autocrats themselves are. In fact, the "modest harvest" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2013) would suggest that – despite significant ruler turnover – the economic and institutional structures that undergird the regimes of the MENA region may continue to be strong. Certainly, this is the case in Egypt, and when combined with the ability of El-Sisi to reconstitute some portion of the Egyptian national identity, the Egyptian military has produced a strong counterrevolutionary push. Further, scholars who have studied digital media in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have noted that the very psycho-social processes that bound opposition movements initially have contributed to their fragmentation, a phenomenon aided by the silo effects of digital media (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2017;

Howard 2013). Those who were able to ignore significant differences in favor of their common, personal hatred of an autocrat may then find it difficult to continue their alliances when they discover that their political visions are dramatically different. This implies the possibility of a reverse of the blaming strategies of monarchies; instead of the monarchy devolving blame to less powerful actors, the regime concentrates blame in a perceptibly powerful, though ultimately expendable autocrat. This seems to have been the strategy of the military in Egypt, which had reportedly discussed – and planned for - Mubarak's removal for some time prior to 2011. As an ignorance of identity processes might make an autocrat vulnerable, so too might careful attention to these factors by regime operatives help to secure their structural influence.

Despite the difficulties that Arab citizens may face in confronting deeply-rooted regime structures, the increased mobilization afforded by digital media strategies does present stability issues for autocratic states generally. Frequent mass protests are highly disruptive, especially for states that rely on tourist revenue or military aid that may be withdrawn if they are seen to be too repressive (Lawson 2015, Beissinger 2017). Additionally, as digitally-mediate protest mature, it is not a guarantee that attention will not eventually fall on the background structures that help to maintain autocratic structures beyond the survival of specific leaders. Certainly, the personalization of an autocrat is a powerful motivator of mass protest, but if those forces can be turned toward structural targets, then they may work to erode power bases that regimes have relied on for decades. A recent analysis of the function of mega-cities in developing societies makes a similar point, arguing that the command-and-control power that large capitol cities afford governments – a function of the incentives of global capital - are also increasingly vulnerable to disruption if the correct targets are identified (Harvey 2012). Finally, it seems that a newly mobilized Arab citizenry could more readily be recruited for traditional forms of organized opposition, seeding the future of a more robust civil society sphere in the region. In my own sample, organizational membership increased from an average of 5.4% across the four cases in 2013, to

an average of 14.5% in 2018. To be sure, though the current threat of new forms of digital organizing constitute are more obvious threats to autocrats themselves, regimes would do well to monitor its development over time.

This report also sets an extensive research agenda around this topic for the MENA region. First, many of the above citations on the processes of identity formation, leadership, and motivations for behavior come from studies conducted in the United States and Europe, and significant replication efforts should be made to validate those concepts and theories in the context of the MEAN region. Second, country-specific experimental work on the triggers related to protest attendance is needed, as well as the preceding cues that indicate shifts in affective structure and emotional climes, such that scholars might better identify societies that are primed for mass mobilization, and perhaps predict the triggers – especially those related to autocratic behavior – that might produce large-scale opposition. While these are difficult factors to pin down, research on virality, crowd-behavior, and emotional triggers has gained steam in the United States and Europe, and there is little excuse to eschew these factors in the MENA region. Finally, we need better theories for how identities, preferences, and affective structures shift over time. Over a decade ago, Weyland (2007) challenged scholars of institutional change to better theorize the very change they struggled so mightily to predict, and the field has yet to respond effectively to this challenge. This includes both long and short-term shifts, the former a product of incremental structural change that alters the preferences that citizens have for their leadership, the latter a product of emotional shifts that – while less stable – may still produce intense contentious action for those who fail to predict these shifts, and find themselves on the wrong side of an oppositional narrative. Taken together, this report calls for an increased focus on identity, emotions, and other micro-foundations of protest that were assigned secondary relevance for much of the recent research on the MENA region.

VII. Appendix A: Full Tables with Demographic Covariates

Table 3 (corresponds to Table 1 above)

Correlation of Media Usage and Protest Participation			
	Dependent variable:		
	Attendance		
	(Wave 3)	(Wave 4)	(Wave 5)
Use Internet for Pol. News	0.226	0.253*	0.115
	(.180)	(.148)	(.371)
Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions	0.459***	0.647***	NA
	(.174)	(.154)	
Internet Usage (frequency)	-.117**	-.097**	.064
	(.050)	(.041)	(.050)
Social Media Usage (frequency)	NA	NA	.173**
			(048)
Television Usage (frequency)	-0.079	-0.061	.136**
	(.075)	(.046)	(.050)
Membership in CSO	.631***	1.24***	1.09***
	(.146)	(.135)	(.087)
Membership in Pol. Party	0.780**	1.01**	NA
	(.253)	(.329)	
Jordan	-2.36***	-1.58***	-1.04***
	(.183)	(.165)	(.112)
Morocco	-1.01***	.136	.876***
	(.220)	(.137)	(.116)
Egypt	-0.368***	-1.70***	-.131
	(.147)	(.182)	(.112)
Tunisia	NA	NA	NA
Education	.121*	.214***	.078**
	(.052)	(.054)	(.030)
Income	-.000	-.032	-.238
	(.000)	(.019)	(.090)
Urban	.588***	.005	NA
	.129	(.121)	
Gender	-1.03***	-.617***	-.618***

	(.132)	(.114)	(.079)
Public Employee	.187	.169	.261*
	(.157)	(173)	(.102)
Age	-.002***	-.005	-.004
	(.001)	(.005)	(.003)
Religiosity	.006	.028	-.040
	(.010)	(.092)	(.058)
Unemployed	.270	-.180	-.041
	(.169)	(.158)	(.109)
Constant	1.168**	0.486	1.134***
	(0.493)	(0.477)	(0.371)
Observations	4,330	4,319	5,203
Log Likelihood	-1,059.045	-1,261.282	-2,367.123
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,156.090	2,560.564	4,768.245
Note:			*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<0.001

TABLE 4 (corresponds to Table 2 above)

Motivations for Protest Participation			
	Dependent variable:		
	Attendance		
	(Wave 3)	(Wave 4)	(Wave 5)
Economic Anxiety	.004	0.015	.008
	(.606)	(.049)	(.325)
Lack of Security	-.004	.000	NA
	(.081)	(.072)	
Perceptions of Social Inequality	.084	.029	NA
	(.068)	(.060)	
Trust in Government	-.153*	-.113*	.087*
	(.074)	(.068)	(.042)
Trust in Police	-.190**	-.125*	.133***
	(.068)	(.063)	(.037)
Frustration with Lack of Reform	.510	.057	NA
	(.085)	(.068)	

Corruption in State Institutions	.510*	-.068	.204***
	(.226)	(.085)	(.049)
Jordan	-2.07***	-1.34***	-.681***
	(.201)	(.181)	(.107)
Morocco	-1.03***	.614***	1.30***
	(.229)	(.148)	(.109)
Egypt	-.709***	-1.49***	0.394***
	(.169)	(.193)	(.108)
Tunisia	NA	NA	NA
Education	.228***	.371***	.160***
	(.054)	(.053)	(.024)
Income	.000	-.014	-.075
	(.000)	(.019)	(.079)
Urban	.587***	-.009	NA
	(.137)	(.123)	
Gender	-1.17***	-.545***	-.732***
	(.141)	(.005)	(.070)
Public Employee	.433**	.282	.401***
	(.160)	(.174)	(.093)
Age	-.028***	-.010*	-.009***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.003)
Religiosity	.021	.013	.033
	(.104)	(.096)	(.053)
Unemployed	.237	-.157	-.143
	(.179)	(.164)	(.106)
Constant	1.020*	-0.023	0.698**
	(0.606)	(0.540)	(0.325)
Observations	3,580	3,469	6,783
Log Likelihood	-935.394	-1,156.700	-2,954.250
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,910.789	2,355.401	5,940.501
Note:	*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<0.001

VIII. Appendix B: Data Replication

*For a full look at the variables used in this study, including their scale and order, please refer to the codebooks available at https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/. The list below identifies the variables used in each wave, as referenced in the codebook. Data downloads are available at the same page

Variable List and Description

- Use Internet for Pol. News
  - Q4101 (Wave 3 and 4), Q421 (Wave 5)
- Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions
  - Q4102 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Internet Usage (frequency)
  - Q409 (all waves)
- Social Media Usage (frequency)
  - Q424 (Wave 5)
- Television Usage (frequency)
  - Q4061 (Wave 3 and 4), Q423_1 (Wave 5)
- Membership in CSO
  - Q5012-Q50110 (Wave 3), Q501 (Wave 4 and 5)
- Membership in Pol. Party
  - Q501b (Wave 3 and 4)
- Economic Anxiety
  - Q102 (all waves)
- Lack of Security
  - Q105 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Perceptions of Social Inequality
  - Q106 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Trust in Government
  - Q2011 (all waves)
- Trust in Police
  - Q2014 (all waves)
- Frustration with lack of reform
  - Q202 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Corruption in state institutions
  - Q210 (all waves)
- Education
  - Q1003 (all waves)
- Income
  - Q1015 (all waves)
- Urban
  - Q13 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Gender
  - Q1002 (all waves)
- Public Employee

    - Q1006a (all waves)
- Age
    - Q1001 (all waves)
- Religiosity
    - Q609 (all waves)
- Unemployed
    - Q1005 (all waves)

Replication Code for Table 1

Wave 3:

```
abdataIII<-import("ABIII_English.dta")

abdataIII[abdataIII==98]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==99]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==96]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==999]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==9999994]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==9999996]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==9999998]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==9999999]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==9]<-NA
abdataIII[abdataIII==0]<-NA


abdataIII$intpol<-NA
abdataIII$intpol[which(abdataIII$q4101==1)]<-1
abdataIII$intpol[which(abdataIII$q4101==2|abdataIII$q409==5)]<-0

abdataIII$intexp<-NA
abdataIII$intexp[which(abdataIII$q4102==1)]<-1
abdataIII$intexp[which(abdataIII$q4102==2|abdataIII$q409==5)]<-0

abdataIII$member<-NA
abdataIII$member[which(abdataIII$q5012==2&abdataIII$q5013==2&abdataIII$q5014==2&abdataIII$q5
015==2&abdataIII$q50110==2)]<-0
abdataIII$member[which(abdataIII$q5012==1|abdataIII$q5013==1|abdataIII$q5014==1|abdataIII$q501
5==1|abdataIII$q50110==1)]<-1

abdataIII$urban<-0
abdataIII$urban[which(abdataIII$q13==1)]<-1

abdataIII$party<-NA
abdataIII$party[which(abdataIII$q501b==2)]<-0
abdataIII$party[which(abdataIII$q501b==1)]<-1
```

```
abdataIII$attend<-NA
abdataIII$attend[which(abdataIII$q800a==1)]<-1
abdataIII$attend[which(abdataIII$q800a==2)]<-0

abdataIII$public<-NA
abdataIII$public[which(abdataIII$q1006a==1)]<-1
abdataIII$public[which(abdataIII$q1006a==2|abdataIII$q1006a==3|abdataIII$q1006a==0|abdataIII$q10
04==2|abdataIII$q1004==0)]<-0
abdataIII$public


abdataIII$unemployed<-NA
abdataIII$unemployed[which(abdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII$q1005==5)]<-1
abdataIII$unemployed[which(abdataIII$q1004==1|abdataIII$q1004==0|(abdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII
$q1005==0)|(abdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII$q1005==1)|(abdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII$q1005==2)|(a
bdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII$q1005==3)|(abdataIII$q1004==2&abdataIII$q1005==4))]<-0
abdataIII$unemployed


abdataIII$education<-NA
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==1|abdataIII$q1003t==1)]<-0
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==2|abdataIII$q1003t==2)]<-1
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==3|abdataIII$q1003t==3)]<-2
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==4|abdataIII$q1003t==4|abdataIII$q1003==5)]<-3
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==6|abdataIII$q1003t==5)]<-4
abdataIII$education[which(abdataIII$q1003==7|abdataIII$q1003t==6)]<-5

abdataIII$jordan<-0
abdataIII$jordan[which(abdataIII$country==8)]<-1
abdataIII$morocco<-0
abdataIII$morocco[which(abdataIII$country==13)]<-1
abdataIII$egypt<-0
abdataIII$egypt[which(abdataIII$country==5)]<-1
abdataIII$tunisia<-0
abdataIII$tunisia[which(abdataIII$country==21)]<-1

abdataIIIfull<-abdataIII[which(abdataIII$country %in% c(8,13,5,21)),]

abdataIII[abdataIII==8]<-NA


abdataIIIfull$country<-NULL


abdataIIIfull[abdataIIIfull==8]<-NA
```

```
reg6full3<-
glm(attend~intpol+intexp+q409+q4061+member+party+q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+educatio
n+q1015+urban+q1002+public+q1001+q609+unemployed, data=abdataIIIfull,
family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Wave 4

```
abdataIV<-import("ABIV_English.dta")

abdataIV[abdataIV==98]<-NA
abdataIV[abdataIV==99]<-NA
abdataIV[abdataIV==96]<-NA
abdataIV[abdataIV==999]<-NA


abdataIV$urban<-NA
abdataIV$urban[which(abdataIV$q13==1)]<-1
abdataIV$urban[which(abdataIV$q13==2)]<-0

abdataIV$intpol<-NA
abdataIV$intpol[which(abdataIV$q4101==1)]<-1
abdataIV$intpol[which(abdataIV$q4101==2|abdataIV$q409==6)]<-0

abdataIV$intexp<-NA
abdataIV$intexp[which(abdataIV$q4102==1)]<-1
abdataIV$intexp[which(abdataIV$q4102==2|abdataIV$q409==6)]<-0

abdataIV$org<-NA
abdataIV$org[which(abdataIV$q501==2)]<-0
abdataIV$org[which(abdataIV$q501==1)]<-1

abdataIV$party<-NA
abdataIV$party[which(abdataIV$q501b==2)]<-0
abdataIV$party[which(abdataIV$q501b==1)]<-1


abdataIV$attend<-NA
abdataIV$attend[which(abdataIV$q5022==2|abdataIV$q5022==1|abdataIV$q5021==2|abdataIV$q502
1==1)]<-1
abdataIV$attend[which((abdataIV$q5022==3)&(abdataIV$q5021==3))]<-0



abdataIV$public<-NA
abdataIV$public[which(abdataIV$q1006a==1)]<-1
abdataIV$public[which(abdataIV$q1006a==2|abdataIV$q1006a==3|abdataIV$q1004==2|abdataIV$q10
06==2)]<-0
```

```
abdataIV$unemployed<-NA
abdataIV$unemployed[which(abdataIV$q1004==2&abdataIV$q1005==5)]<-1
abdataIV$unemployed[which(abdataIV$q1004==1|(abdataIV$q1004==2&abdataIV$q1005==1)|(abdataI
V$q1004==2&abdataIV$q1005==2)|(abdataIV$q1004==2&abdataIV$q1005==3)|(abdataIV$q1004==2&
abdataIV$q1005==4))]<-0


abdataIV$education<-NA
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==1|abdataIV$t1003==1)]<-0
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==2|abdataIV$t1003==2)]<-1
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==3|abdataIV$t1003==3)]<-2
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==4|abdataIV$t1003==4|abdataIV$q1003==5)]<-3
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==6|abdataIV$t1003==5)]<-4
abdataIV$education[which(abdataIV$q1003==7|abdataIV$t1003==6)]<-5


abdataIV$income<-NA
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==1|abdataIV$q1015begy==1|abdataIV$q1015bjor==1|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==1|abdataIV$q1015btun==1)]<-1
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==2|abdataIV$q1015begy==2|abdataIV$q1015bjor==2|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==2|abdataIV$q1015btun==2)]<-2
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==3|abdataIV$q1015begy==3|abdataIV$q1015bjor==3|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==3|abdataIV$q1015btun==3)]<-3
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==4|abdataIV$q1015begy==4|abdataIV$q1015bjor==4|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==4|abdataIV$q1015btun==4)]<-4
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==5|abdataIV$q1015begy==5|abdataIV$q1015bjor==5|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==5|abdataIV$q1015btun==5)]<-5
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015balg==6|abdataIV$q1015begy==6|abdataIV$q1015bjor==6|ab
dataIV$q1015bmor==6)]<-6
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==1|abdataIV$q1015cegy==1|abdataIV$q1015cjor==1|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==1|abdataIV$q1015ctun==1)]<-7
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==2|abdataIV$q1015cegy==2|abdataIV$q1015cjor==2|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==2|abdataIV$q1015ctun==2)]<-8
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==3|abdataIV$q1015cegy==3|abdataIV$q1015cjor==3|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==3|abdataIV$q1015ctun==3)]<-9
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==4|abdataIV$q1015cegy==4|abdataIV$q1015cjor==4|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==4|abdataIV$q1015ctun==4)]<-10
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==5|abdataIV$q1015cegy==5|abdataIV$q1015cjor==5|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==5|abdataIV$q1015ctun==5)]<-11
abdataIV$income[which(abdataIV$q1015calg==6|abdataIV$q1015cegy==6|abdataIV$q1015cjor==6|ab
dataIV$q1015cmor==6|abdataIV$q1015ctun==6)]<-12
```

```
abdataIV$jordan<-0
abdataIV$jordan[which(abdataIV$country==8&abdataIV$sample==1)]<-1
abdataIV$morocco<-0
abdataIV$morocco[which(abdataIV$country==13)]<-1
abdataIV$tunisia<-0
abdataIV$tunisia[which(abdataIV$country==21)]<-1
abdataIV$egypt<-0
abdataIV$egypt[which(abdataIV$country==5)]<-1


abdataIVfull<-subset(abdataIV,country==13|country==5|country==8|country==21)


reg6full4<-
glm(attend~intpol+intexp+q409+q4061+org+party+q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+education+inc
ome+urban+q1002+public+q1001+q609+unemployed, data=abdataIVfull, family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Wave 5

```
abdataV<-import("ABV_Crossectional_Data_Release_ENG.dta")

abdataV[abdataV==98]<-NA
abdataV[abdataV==99]<-NA
abdataV[abdataV==96]<-NA
abdataV[abdataV==88]<-NA
abdataV[abdataV==999]<-NA
abdataV[abdataV==99999]<-NA


abdataV$intpol<-NA
abdataV$intpol[which(abdataV$Q421==6)]<-1
abdataV$intpol[which(abdataV$Q421==2|abdataV$Q409==6|abdataV$Q421==1|abdataV$Q421==3|ab
dataV$Q421==4|abdataV$Q421==5|abdataV$Q421==7)]<-0

abdataV$org<-NA
abdataV$org[which(abdataV$Q501==2)]<-0
abdataV$org[which(abdataV$Q501==1)]<-1


abdataV$attend<-NA
abdataV$attend[which(abdataV$Q502_2==2|abdataV$Q502_2==1|abdataV$Q502_1==2|abdataV$Q50
2_1==1|abdataV$Q502_4==2|abdataV$Q502_4==1)]<-1
abdataV$attend[which((abdataV$Q502_2==3)&(abdataV$Q502_1==3)&(abdataV$Q502_4==3))]<-0
```

```
abdataV$public<-NA
abdataV$public[which(abdataV$Q1006A==1)]<-1
abdataV$public[which(abdataV$Q1006A==2|abdataV$Q1006A==3|abdataV$Q1005==3|abdataV$Q100
5==4|abdataV$Q1005==6|abdataV$Q1005==5|abdataV$Q1005==7)]<-0

abdataV$unemployed<-NA
abdataV$unemployed[which(abdataV$Q1005==6)]<-1
abdataV$unemployed[which(abdataV$Q1005==1|abdataV$Q1005==2|abdataV$Q1005==3|abdataV$Q
1005==4|abdataV$Q1005==5|abdataV$Q1005==7)]<-0

abdataV$income<-NA
abdataV$income[which(abdataV$Q1015A_JO==1|abdataV$Q1015A_EG==1|abdataV$Q1015A_TUN==1
|abdataV$Q1015A_MO==1)]<-0
abdataV$income[which(abdataV$Q1015A_JO==2|abdataV$Q1015A_EG==2|abdataV$Q1015A_TUN==2
|abdataV$Q1015A_MO==2)]<-1

abdataV$jordan<-0
abdataV$jordan[which(abdataV$country==8&abdataV$sample==1)]<-1
abdataV$morocco<-0
abdataV$morocco[which(abdataV$country==13)]<-1
abdataV$tunisia<-0
abdataV$tunisia[which(abdataV$country==21)]<-1
abdataV$egypt<-0
abdataV$egypt[which(abdataV$country==5)]<-1


abdataVfull<-subset(abdataV,country==13|country==5|country==8|country==21)

reg6full5<-
glm(attend~intpol+Q409+Q423_1+Q424+org+Q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+Q1003+income+Q
1002+public+Q1001+Q609+unemployed, data=abdataVfull, family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Replication Code for Table 2 (repeat data cleaning and variable coding from above)

Wave 3

```
reg10full3<-
glm(attend~q102+q105+q106+q2011+q2014+q202+q210+q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+educat
ion+q1015+urban+q1002+public+q1001+q609+unemployed, data=abdataIIIfull,
family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Wave 4

```
reg10full4<-
glm(attend~q102+q105+q106+q2011+q2014+q202+q210+q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+educat
ion+income+urban+q1002+public+q1001+q609+unemployed, data=abdataIVfull,
family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Wave 5

```
reg10full5<-
glm(attend~Q102+Q201A_1+Q201A_42+Q210+Q404+jordan+morocco+egypt+tunisia+Q1003+income+
Q1002+public+Q1001+Q609+unemployed, data=abdataVfull, family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

IX. Works Cited

Abderrahim, Lamchichi. "Islam et contestation au Maghreb." (1989).

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. “Social identity and self-categorisation.” In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.*), The SAGE handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination* (pp. 179-193). London: Sage (2010).

Aburish, Said. *Nasser, the Last Arab.* New York: St. Martin’s Press (2004).

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso books, 2006.

Anderson, Lisa. "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (1991): 1-15.

Anderson, Lisa. "Demystifying the Arab spring: parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya." *Foreign Affairs* (2011): 2-7.

Atton, C. ed. *The Routledge companion to alternative and community media*. Routledge, 2015.

Barany, Zoltan. "Unrest and state response in Arab monarchies." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2013): 5-38.

Baray, Gamze, Tom Postmes, and Jolanda Jetten. "When I equals we: Exploring the relation between social and personal identity of extreme right-wing political party members." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 48, no. 4 (2009): 625-647.

Bayat, Asef. *Revolutions without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 2017.

Bandura, A. Social cognitive theory of mass communication. In *Media effects* (pp. 110-140). Routledge, 2009.

Beissinger, Mark R. "" Conventional" and" Virtual" Civil Societies in Autocratic Regimes." *Comparative Politics* 49, no. 3 (2017): 351-371.

Belkhodja, Tahar. *Les trois décennies Bourguiba*. *Témoignage*. Paris: Publisud (1998).

Bellin, E. The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective. *Comparative politics*, pp.139-157, 2004.

Benchemsi, Ahmed. "Morocco: Outfoxing the opposition." *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 1 (2012): 57-69.

Bennett, W.L. and Segerberg, A. *The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Bennett, W.L., Segerberg, A. and Yang, Y. The Strength of Peripheral Networks: Negotiating Attention and Meaning in Complex Media Ecologies. *Journal of Communication*, *68*(4), (2018), pp.659-684.

Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual review of sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 611-639.

Bergstrand, Kelly, and James M. Jasper. "Villains, Victims, and Heroes in Character Theory and Affect Control Theory." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 81, no. 3 (2018): 228-247.

Bimber, B. Three prompts for collective action in the context of digital media. *Political Communication*, *34*(1) (2017), pp.6-20.

Blaydes, Lisa. *Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2010

Bradley, John R. *After the Arab spring: how Islamists hijacked the Middle East revolts*. St. Martin's Press, 2012.

Brewer, Marilynn B. "The social self: On being the same and different at the same time." *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 17, no. 5 (1991): 475-482

Brownlee, J., Masoud, T. and Reynolds, A. Why the modest harvest?. *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(4) (2013), pp.29-44.

Byrne, D. *The Attraction Paradigm.* New York: Academic Press (1971).

Callinicos, Alex. "What Does Revolution Mean in the Twenty-First Century?" Pp. 151-64 in *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World*, edited by John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic. London: Routledge, 2008.

Castells, M. *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the Internet age*. John Wiley & Sons, 2015.

Cavatorta, Francesco, and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle. "The end of authoritarian rule and the mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali." *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 2 (2012): 179-195.

Cheng, Grand H-L., Kelly S. Fielding, Michael A. Hogg, and Deborah J. Terry. "Reactions to procedural discrimination in an intergroup context: The role of group membership of the authority." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 12, no. 4 (2009): 463-478.

Clark, Janine. *Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: strategies of centralization and decentralization*. New York: Columbia University Press (2018).

Cull, Nicholas John, David Holbrook Culbert, and David Welch. *Propaganda and mass persuasion: A historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the present*. ABC-CLIO, 2003.

Davis, M. Planet of slums. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, *23*(2), pp.6-11, 2006.

Dickovick, J. Tyler. *The World Today Series: Africa 2012*. Lanham, Maryland: Stryker-Post Publications (2008).

Dovidio, John F., Samuel L. Gaertner, Ana Validzic, Kimberly Matoka, Brenda Johnson, and Stacy Frazier. "Extending the benefits of recategorization: Evaluations, self-disclosure, and helping." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 33, no. 4 (1997): 401-420.

Dovidio, John F., Samuel L. Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy. "Another view of "we": Majority and minority group perspectives on a common ingroup identity." *European review of social psychology* 18, no. 1 (2008): 296-330.

Dovidio, J., Gaertner, S., & Saguy, T. "Commonality and the complexity of "we": Social attitudes and social change." *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* 13 (2009), 3–20.

Duckitt, J. A dual process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 33, pp. 41–113). San Diego, CA: Academic, 2001.

Duckitt, J. and Sibley, C.G. Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual-process motivational model. *Journal of personality*, *78*(6) (2010), pp.1861-1894.

Duman, Hazal, and Behcet Yalın Ozkara. "The impact of social identity on online game addiction: the mediating role of the fear of missing out (FoMO) and the moderating role of the need to belong." *Current Psychology* (2019): 1-10.

Eickelman, D.F. The Public Sphere, the Arab "Street" and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit. *Global Media Journal*, *3*(2), 2003.

Ellison, N.B., Steinfield, C. and Lampe, C. The benefits of Facebook "friends:" Social capital and college students' use of online social network sites. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *12*(4) (2007), pp.1143-1168

Evans, J.S.B. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, *59* (2008), pp.255-278.

Evans, J.S.B. and Stanovich, K.E. Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. *Perspectives on psychological science*, *8*(3) (2013), pp.223-241.

Farrell, H. The consequences of the internet for politics. *Annual review of political science*, *15* (2012).

Gaertner, S., & Dovidio, J. *Reducing intergroup bias. The common ingroup identity model*. Philadelphia, PA:Taylor and Francis, 2000.

Gaertner, Samuel L., and John F. Dovidio. *Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model*. Philadelphia: PA. Psychology Press (2014).

Gaffney, Amber M., David E. Rast III, and Michael A. Hogg. "Uncertainty and influence: The advantages (and disadvantages) of being atypical." *Journal of Social Issues* 74, no. 1 (2018): 20-35.

Gause III, F.G. Why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring: The myth of authoritarian stability. *Foreign Affairs*, (2011) pp.81-90.'

Gause III, F. Gregory. "Why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring: The myth of authoritarian stability." *Foreign Affairs* (2011): 81-90.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph George Wright, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. *How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Giessner, Steffen R., and Daan van Knippenberg. ""License to fail": Goal definition, leader group prototypicality, and perceptions of leadership effectiveness after leader failure." *Organizational behavior and human decision processes* 105, no. 1 (2008): 14-35.

Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Gordon, Randall A. "Impact of ingratiation on judgments and evaluations: A meta-analytic investigation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 1 (1996): 54.

Hale, H.E. Regime change cascades: What we have learned from the 1848 revolutions to the 2011 Arab uprisings. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *16*, (2013) pp.331-353.

Harris, R.J. and Sanborn, F.W. *A cognitive psychology of mass communication*. Routledge, 2013.

Harvey, David. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. Verso: New York, NY, 2012.

Hammoudi, Abdellah. *Master and disciple: The cultural foundations of Moroccan authoritarianism*. University of Chicago Press (1997).

Haslam, S. Alexander, Penelope J. Oakes, Craig McGarty, John C. Turner, and Rina S. Onorato. "Contextual changes in the prototypicality of extreme and moderate outgroup members." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 25, no. 5 (1995): 509-530.

Haslam, S. Alexander, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow. *The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power*. Psychology Press, 2010.

Hogg, Michael A. "A social identity theory of leadership." *Personality and social psychology review* 5, no. 3 (2001): 184-200.

Hogg, M. A.. & van Knippenberg, D. "Social identity and leadership processes in groups." In M. P. Zanna (Ed.). *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 35, pp. 1-52). San Diego, CA: Academic Press (2003).

Hogg, Michael A., Daan van Knippenberg, and David E. Rast III. "The social identity theory of leadership: Theoretical origins, research findings, and conceptual developments." *European Review of Social Psychology* 23, no. 1 (2012): 258-304.

Hogg. M. A.. "All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others: Social identity and marginal membership." In K. D. Williams. J. P. Forgas, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), *The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying* (pp. 243-261). New York: Psychology Press (2005).

Hogg, Michael A., and Scott A. Reid. "Social identity, self-categorization, and the communication of group norms." *Communication theory* 16, no. 1 (2006): 7-30.

Hood, Christopher. *The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Hornsey, Matthew J., and Michael A. Hogg. "Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26, no. 2 (2000): 242-256.

Howard, P.N. and Hussain, M.M. *Democracy's fourth wave?: digital media and the Arab Spring*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Hudson, Michael C. *Arab politics: the search for legitimacy*. New Haven; CT. Yale University Press (1977).

Jankowski, James. *Nasser's Egypt: Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2001).

Jasper, James M., Michael Young, and Elke Zuern. "Character work in social movements." *Theory and Society* 47, no. 1 (2018): 113-131.

Jones, B.D. Bounded rationality. *Annual review of political science*, *2*(1) (1999), pp.297-321.

Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds. *Judgment under Uncertainty.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Kandil, Hazem. *Soldiers, spies, and statesmen: Egypt's road to revolt*. Brooklyn: Verso Trade, 2014.

Khraidy, Marwan M. *The naked blogger of Cairo: Creative insurgency in the Arab world*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.

Kinnvall, Catarina. "Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological security." *Political psychology* 25, no. 5 (2004): 741-767.

Lacroix, Stephane. *Egypt's Pragmatic Salafis: The Politics of Hizb al-Nour*. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.

Larson, J., Nagler, J., Ronen, J. and Tucker, J. Social networks and protest participation: Evidence from 93 million twitter users. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2796391, 2016.

Lawrence, Adria K. "Repression and activism among the Arab Spring's first movers: Evidence from Morocco's February 20th movement." *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 3 (2017): 699-718.

Lawson, G. Revolution, Nonviolence, and the Arab Uprisings. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *20*(4) (2015), pp.453-470.

Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D. and Pearce, I. The Arab Spring| the revolutions were tweeted: Information flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. *International journal of communication*, *5* (2011), p.31.

Lucas, Russell E. *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic responses to external challenges, 1988-2001*. SUNY Press, 2012.

Lukes, Steven. *Power: A radical view*. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2004.

Lynch, Marc. "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State." *Perspectives on Politics* 9(2) (2011): 301-310.

Lynch, Marc. *The Arab Uprising*. New York: Public Affairs, 2012.

Lynch, M., Freelon, D. and Aday, S.. Online clustering, fear and uncertainty in Egypt's transition. *Democratization*, *24*(6) (2017), pp.1159-1177.

Molenberghs, Pascal, Guy Prochilo, Niklas K. Steffens, Hannes Zacher, and S. Alexander Haslam. "The neuroscience of inspirational leadership: The importance of collective-oriented language and shared group membership." *Journal of Management* 43, no. 7 (2017): 2168-2194.

Moss, Sigrun Marie. "Identity Hierarchy Within the Sudanese Superordinate Identity: Political Leadership Promoting and Demoting Subordinate Groups." *Political Psychology* 38, no. 6 (2017): 925-942.

Müller, Marion G., and Arvid Kappas. "Visual emotions–emotional visuals: Emotions, pathos formulae, and their relevance for communication research." In *The Routledge handbook of emotions and mass media*, pp. 324-345. Routledge, 2010.

Otten, Sabine, and Gordon B. Moskowitz. "Evidence for implicit evaluative in-group bias: Affect-biased spontaneous trait inference in a minimal group paradigm." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36, no. 1 (2000): 77-89.

Osman, Tarek. *Egypt on the Brink: from Nasser to Mubarak*. Yale University Press, 2010.

Pearlman, Wendy. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2) (2013): 387-409.

Platow, Michael J., and Daan van Knippenberg. "A social identity analysis of leadership endorsement: The effects of leader ingroup prototypicality and distributive intergroup fairness." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27, no. 11 (2001): 1508-1519.

Platow, Michael J., Daan van Knippenberg, S. Alexander Haslam, Barbara van Knippenberg, and Russell Spears. "A special gift we bestow on you for being representative of us: Considering leader charisma from a self-categorization perspective." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 45, no. 2 (2006): 303-320.

Przybylski, A.K., Murayama, K., DeHaan, C.R. and Gladwell, V. Motivational, emotional, and behavioral correlates of fear of missing out. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *29*(4) (2013), pp.1841-1848.

Reeskens, Tim, and Matthew Wright. "Nationalism and the cohesive society: A multilevel analysis of the interplay among diversity, national identity, and social capital across 27 European societies." *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 2 (2013): 153-181.

Reicher, S,, & Hopkins, N. "On the science of the art of leadership." In D, van Knippenberg & M, A, Hogg (Eds,), *Leadership and power: Identity processes in groups and organisations* (pp, 197-209), London: Sage (2003).

Robbins, Jordan M., and Joachim I. Krueger. "Social projection to ingroups and outgroups: A review and meta-analysis." *Personality and social psychology review* 9, no. 1 (2005): 32-47.

Robinson, Dawn T., Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Allison K. Wisecup. "Affect control theory." In *Handbook of the sociology of emotions*, pp. 179-202. Springer, Boston, MA, 2006.

Ryan, Curtis. *Jordan and the Arab Uprisings: Regime Survival and Politics Beyond the State*. New York: Columbia University Press (2018).

Sater, James. *Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity*. London: Routledge (2010).

Seyranian, Viviane, and Michelle C. Bligh. "Presidential charismatic leadership: Exploring the rhetoric of social change." *The Leadership Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (2008): 54-76.

Shadid, Anthony and David Kirkpatrick. 'Mubarak Refuses to Step Down, Stoking Revolt's Fury and Resolve.' *The New York times*. 10 February, 2011.

Smith, E.R. and DeCoster, J. Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. *Personality and social psychology review*, *4*(2)M (2000), pp.108-131.

Spiegel, Avi Max. *Young Islam: The new politics of religion in Morocco and the Arab world*. Vol. 57. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Steinert-Threlkeld, Z.C. Spontaneous collective action: peripheral mobilization during the Arab spring. *American Political Science Review*, *111*(2) (2017), pp.379-403.

Stone, Jeff, Andrew W. Wiegand, Joel Cooper, and Elliot Aronson. "When exemplification fails: hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 72, no. 1 (1997): 54.

Storm, Lise. *Democratization in Morocco*. London: Routledge (2007).

Svolik, Milan W. *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Swann Jr, William B., Angel Gómez, D. Conor Seyle, J. Morales, and Carmen Huici. "Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 96, no. 5 (2009): 995.

Swann Jr, William B., Jolanda Jetten, Ángel Gómez, Harvey Whitehouse, and Brock Bastian. "When group membership gets personal: A theory of identity fusion." *Psychological review* 119, no. 3 (2012): 441.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33 – 48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole (1979).

Tobin, Sarah A. "Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution." *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 1 (2012): 96-109.

Tufekci, Z. and Wilson, C. Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: Observations from Tahrir Square. *Journal of communication*, *62*(2) (2012), pp.363-379.

Turel, O., He, Q., Xue, G., Xiao, L. and Bechara, A. Examination of neural systems sub-serving Facebook "addiction". *Psychological Reports*, *115*(3) (2014), pp.675-695.

Turkle, S. *Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from ourselves*. New York: Basic Books, 2011.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorisation theory*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell (1987).

Transue, John E. "Identity salience, identity acceptance, and racial policy attitudes: American national identity as a uniting force." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 78-91.

Van Knippenberg, Barbara, and Daan Van Knippenberg. "Leader self-sacrifice and leadership effectiveness: the moderating role of leader prototypicality." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 90, no. 1 (2005): 25.

Wagemakers, Joas. *Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietist Community*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Walther, J.B., Gay, G. and Hancock, J.T. How do communication and technology researchers study the internet?. *Journal of communication*, *55*(3) (2005), pp.632-657.

Waterbury, John. *The Commander of the Faithful*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

Weyland, Kurt. "Toward a new theory of institutional change." *World Politics* 60, no. 2 (2008): 281-314.

Weyland, Kurt. "The Arab Spring: Why the surprising similarities with the revolutionary wave of 1848?." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 917-934.

Whittier, Nancy. "Emotional strategies: The collective reconstruction and display of oppositional emotions in the movement against child sexual abuse." *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* 233 (2001): 250.

Williamson, Scott. "The king can do no wrong: delegation and blame avoidance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan." Unpublished draft presented at Middle East Studies Association Conference, San Antonio, 2018.

Willis, Michael. *Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from independence to the Arab Spring*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Yom, Sean. "Civil society and democratization in the Arab world." *Middle East* 9, no. 4 (2005): 15-32.

Yom, Sean L., and F. Gregory Gause III. "Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on." *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 4 (2012): 74-88.

Youtube. 'Mubarak's Speech, 10_02_2011 (full) 1 of 2." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfvQt3IV9CU